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CHILDCARE MARKET FAILURE
Meredith Johnson Harbach*
Abstract
In the UnitedStates,family law norms and childcarepolicy have long
reflected the view that childcare is a private,family matter. But childcare
has crossed the private-public divide. In the absence of parents at home
providing care, a substantial childcare market has emerged. And that
market is failing. Our law, policy, and legal scholarship have yet to
recognize and account for this new reality. This Article confronts the
problem on its own terms, using economic analysis to diagnose our
childcare crisis as a market failure, and makes the case for more active
and explicit government intervention in the childcare market. Economic
theory not only helps us understand why the market is failing, but also
recommends specific law and policy levers-subsidies, regulation, and
information-to mitigate market failure, enabling us to craft more
responsive reforms. In the end, the market lens shifts ourfocus from what
is private about caringfor children to what is public about it. From this
vantage point, the Article makes plain that our childcare market is too
big-andtoo important-tofail.
I. INTRODUCTION

Care for children in the United States has crossed the private-public divide. In
the absence of parents at home providing care, a sizable childcare market has
developed.' That market is failing. Childcare quality is wide-ranging, but generally
* © 2015 Meredith Johnson Harbach. Associate Professor, University of Richmond
School of Law. I thank Anne Alstott, Michael Ariens, June Carbone, Erik Craft, James
Dwyer, Maxine Eichner, Jim Gibson, David Harbach, Mary Heen, Clare Huntington,

Corinna Lain, Serena Mayeri, and Laura Rosenbury for helpful comments and reactions at
various stages of this project. I also benefited from feedback during faculty workshops at the
University of Richmond School of Law, William and Mary School of Law, Wake Forest
School of Law, and St. Mary's University School of Law, as well as the following
conferences: Emerging Family Law Scholars and Teachers; Corporate Rights versus
Children's Interests-A Vulnerability and the Human Condition Initiative & Feminism and
Legal Theory Project Workshop; SEALS New Scholars Workshop; and the Legal
Scholarship 4.0 Conference. I also thank Dori Martin, Sarah Bennett, and especially Ashley
Peterson for their terrific research assistance. And finally, I am grateful to the editorial board
of the Utah Law Review for their careful editing of this piece.
I For the purposes of this project, "childcare" is care provided to children under age six
provided by someone other than parents or legal guardians. See NAT'L ASs'N OF CHILD CARE'
RES. & REFERRAL AGENCIES, CHILD CARE: LIKE THE MILITARY, IS IT TIME FOR SHARED
available at
[hereinafter LIKE THE MILITARY],
6 (2011)
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subpar. Parents often lack critical information about what quality care looks like,
how to locate such care, and whether their children are receiving it. Childcare
advocates regularly denounce the childcare "crisis," and studies compellingly
demonstrate the correlation between poor-quality childcare and long-term outcomes.
Our law and policy have yet to fully confront the changing nature of childcare or
deliberately reevaluate what the state's role in the childcare market should be.
Existing state policies are, at best, marginally responsive to the new realities of
childcare. Funding of childcare is meager, and places little, if any, emphasis on
quality. Regulation of childcare varies across states, but is far from rigorous or
consistent. State attempts to provide information about childcare to parents are ad
hoc and incomplete. As both a theoretical and practical matter, there is a sharp
disconnect between our childcare policies and our childcare realities. A fresh look
at the basis for our state childcare policies, therefore, is long overdue.
The law review literature has yet to take this fresh look. Legal scholars have
engaged in a sophisticated debate about the comparative value of market work
versus care work for women. 2 They have analyzed and recommended enhanced
protections for childcare providers. 3 They have considered the implications of
economic theory for a variety of family law questions. 4 And they have debated the
state's responsibility for childcare on philosophical, moral, and equitable grounds.'
http://www.naccrra.org/sites/defaultlfiles/default-site pages/2012/time for shared respre
ptfmalnov28_0.pdf, archivedat https://perma.cc/VJ6Y-QB9A.
2 See, e.g., Meredith Johnson Harbach, Outsourcing Childcare, 24 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 254, 261-62 (2012).
' E.g., Elizabeth J. Kennedy, When the Shop Floor Is in the Living Room: Toward a
Domestic Employment Relationship Theory, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 643, 672-89
(2012); Glenda Labadie-Jackson, Reflections on Domestic Work and the Feminization of
Migration, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 67, 82-90 (2008); Peggie R. Smith, Caringfor Paid
Caregivers:Linking Quality Child Care with Improved Working Conditions, 73 U. CIN. L.
REV. 399, 402 (2004).
4 E.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Some Concerns About Applying Economics to Family Law,
in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY 450, 450
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005); Ann Laquer Estin, Can
Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, 4 MICH. J.GENDER & L. 1, 3, 26 (1996);
Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 81, 84 (1997). There is also well-developed economic literature analyzing family
relationships through the lens of efficiency. E.g., GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMILY 30-31 (enlarged ed. 1991).
5 E.g., MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND
AMERICA'S POLITICAL IDEALS 3-13 (2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the
Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, in FEMINISM
CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 179, 182
[hereinafter Fineman, Cracking the FoundationalMyths]; Maxine Eichner, The Family and
the Market-Redux, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 97, 100 (2012) (critiquing "marketization" of
the family and state's decreased support for caretaking and human development); Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Individualism and Early Childhood in the U.S.: How Culture and
TraditionHave Impeded Evidence-Based Reforms, 8 J. KOREAN L. 135, 146-50 (2008); see
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What they haven't done is examine in depth the new realities of the childcare market,
and explore the implications of economic theory for that market's failings.6
This Article takes up that task. In the analysis that follows, I demonstrate that
our childcare crisis is, in part, a market failure, and I make the case for more active
and explicit government intervention in the childcare market to correct existing
market imperfections. In the process, I seek to disrupt outdated notions of childcare
as an exclusively private matter, and to reorient our law and policy around a more
realistic focus on the public nature of both the provision and benefits of childeare
today.
In Part II, I frame our understanding of existing childcare law and policy by
situating them within larger privacy norms, exposing the disconnect between
childcare policies and childcare realities. In Part III, I enlist economic theory to help
understand the complexities of American childcare, and I. explain how the market
manifests multiple aspects of failure. The economic lens offers a new normative
justification for state engagement with the childcare market: a more active and
transparent state role in childcare justified by the state's legitimate role in acting to
address market failure. In Part IV, I discuss how exploring the state's role in
childcare might evolve to better address market failure in practice.
[1. CHILDCARE AND TIlE STATE: FROM THE PRIVATE FAMILY TO THE MARKET

In the United States, childcare is a family's business. Caregiving for children,
and the economic and structural supports it requires, are the responsibility of parents
themselves rather than the state.7 Extensive government involvement in childcareas with other childrearing decisions-has long been controversial and considered
antithetical to our understandings of family privacy and autonomy. Yet while these
norms may have fit relatively well with childcare practices in the opening decades
of the twentieth century, at the start of our new millennium this model shows
significant signs of strain.

also Deborah Dinner, The Universal ChildcareDebate: Rights Mobilization, Social Policy,
and the Dynamics of Feminist Activism, 1966-1974, 28 L. & HIST. REV. 577, 5.77 (2010)

(exploring history of feminist activists making rights-based arguments for universal
childcare).
6 Some legal scholars have remarked on the shortcomings of our childcare market, but
have not engaged substantively with reform proposals and institutional design. See, e.g.,
Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834, 845 (2002); Katharine B.
Silbaugh, Foreward:The Structuresof Care Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389, 1401 (2001);
Joan Williams, Essay, "'It's Snowing Down South ": How to Help Mothers and Avoid
Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 COLuM. L. REV. 812, 832 (2002). But see
Martha T. McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform, in FEMINISM
CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 193, 199-

200, 220 [hereinafter McCluskey, Politics of Economics] (exploring the implications of
economic theory for failings in the childcare market).
7 Fineman, Crackingthe FoundationalMyths, supra note 5, at 184-85.
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Historically, parents (typically mothers) or other family members provided care
for most young children. But American childcare has experienced a dramatic
transition. As parents increasingly outsource childcare, 8 it has moved from the
private home to the marketplace. What was once provided largely by parents and
family members gratis has been commodified. 9 This transformation poses a
challenge to our traditional understanding of the state's relationship to childcare.
In this Part, I explore the history and evolution of childcare and the state's
relationship to it. I begin by exploring the state's traditional understanding of its
relationship to childcare, locating this understanding within the broader context of
privacy and nonintervention norms, and I explain how these norms have played out
in government childcare policy debates. I next describe the evolution of childcare in
America, a transformation that has rendered our childcare policy incoherent in light
of the changed realities of childcare today. Finally, I test the efficacy of our existing
state orientation toward childcare by assessing the current conditions of America's
childcare market. This analysis suggests that our old assumptions about childcare,
and the norms they relied upon, should no longer drive contemporary childcare
policy.
A. The PrivateFamily Model of Childcare
As any family law student knows, privacy norms and preferences for

nonintervention are hegemonic in much of American family law, influencing the
state role in marriage, divorce, custody, support, and child welfare decisions. 0 The
intersection of privacy norms and American childcare manifests in multiple
contexts.
First, childcare choices are a subset of family decisions protected by welldeveloped privacy doctrines that safeguard parental authority. The family privacy
doctrine seeks to negotiate the boundaries between the state and family, sanctioning
8 Elsewhere,

I have made the case that when parents rely on a series of paid, third-party
collaborations to secure care for their children, they are, in essence, outsourcing childcare.
Harbach, supra note 2, at 270; see also Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Capitalism and the
Erosion of Care, in

UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE NEW

ECONOMY 29, 43 (Jeff Madrick ed., 2000) [hereinafter England & Folbre, Capitalism] ("A
process that can be termed 'the commodification of care' is under way in virtually all
countries. Clearly, this process has some good features, beyond the obvious possibilities for
increases in efficiency."). Parents, like businesses, make strategic decisions about how to
best organize their work and functions. They evaluate which tasks are best done in-house,
and which tasks are good candidates for delegation to outside partners. Outsourcing parents
hire third parties to provide care for their children, and then reintegrate that work into overall
family functioning. Harbach, supra note 2, at 270-78.
9 Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 103. This development is part of a broader trend toward
outsourcing what used to be considered "family" work. Nancy Folbre & Julia A. Nelson, For
Love or Money-Or Both?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 123, 129-30 (2000); Harbach, supra note 2,
at 256-57.
10

2012).

See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS

ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW

20-21 (3d ed.
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private choices and protecting against undue or unwarranted government
involvement. Stated plainly, the doctrine provides a buffer for private decisions in
private spaces, and also seeks to limit public responsibility for families.II The right
of fit parents to make decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children
free from government intrusion is "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests."' 2 In practice, this "enduring American tradition"' 3 affords parents wide
latitude to raise children as they choose.' 4 Parental prerogatives in the upbringing of
children-and thus childcare-rest at the core of this right. 5
The foundational parental authority cases were preoccupied with the state role
in educating and caring for children. The primacy of parental authority assumed
constitutional dimensions in a trio of cases-Meyer v. Nebraska,16 Pierce v. Society
of Sisters,'7 and Prince v. Massachusetts8-involving tensions between families
and the state over the education and work of children.19 In the cultural climate in
which these cases arose, parental rights were linked to democratic values, with a
concomitant distrust of state incursions into parental decision making as a form of

"Of course, although the rhetoric of family privacy and parental rights might suggest
the state's approach to families is strictly hands-off, in reality the state has intervened
pragmatically and regularly in all manner of actual disputes among families and between
families and the state. David D. Meyer, The Paradoxof Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV.
527, 594-95 (2000); see infra notes 174-179 and accompanying text.
12 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
1 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
14 The scope of this authority includes choices concerning the type of care and
education children receive, the religious traditions in which they will be raised, the methods
of discipline, and the basic moral and cultural values parents will pass down to their children.
Cornerstone Christian Schs. v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 136 (5th Cir.
2009). Generally, the state intervenes in these choices only when the well-being of children
is threatened-when parental choices and care fall below the floor that distinguishes
adequate parental care from abuse and neglect. Anne L. Alstott, Property, Taxation, and
Distributive Justice: What Does a Fair Society Owe Children-and Their Parents?, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1955 (2004). An important qualification to this doctrine is that it
applies primarily to intact, marital families. When children are born outside of marriage or
when parents divorce, the state often is intimately involved in even the most basic parental
decisions about how to raise children.
15Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
16 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402-403 (striking down state law that prohibited school
instruction in any language other than English).
'"Pierce,268 U.S. at 534-35 (striking down an Oregon statute that required parents to
send children to public school).
18 Prince,321 U.S. at 173-74 (sustaining state authority to prohibit child labor).
19 While most-if not all-of the language concerning parental authority in Meyer,
Pierce,and Princewas dicta, by the time the Court decided Troxel v. Granville in 2000, the
doctrine was on firm footing. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65-66.
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totalitarianism. 2° By fostering pluralism, the family came to be seen as a check
against state attempts to standardize its citizenry. 2 1 One legacy of these struggles has
been persistent ambivalence about the state role in childrearing and education, and
a deep wariness about state takeover of children.
Second, separate spheres ideology has coded childcare as "private." In the
several centuries preceding the twentieth century, the family shifted-both
ideologically and geographically-from the public sphere of markets, politics, and
government, to the private sphere of family ties and individual freedom, removed

from state interference.22 The trope of "separate spheres" emerged, both reflecting

and reinforcing these new norms and realities. Early family liberty cases recognized
the dividing line between the two spheres, and expressed special solicitude for the
private sphere, a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter. ' '23 Family
liberty doctrine expanded over time to encompass a broader conception of "privacy"
as a right with both decisional and spatial dimensions. The liberty protected by the
In the aftermath of World War I, fears of communism led to American nativism and
a culture hostile to both immigrants and "Anti-American" ideas. Paula Abrams, The Little
Red Schoolhouse: Pierce, State Monopoly of Education and the Politics of Intolerance, 20
CONST. COMMENT. 61, 61-63 (2003). In this setting, compulsory public education was
viewed as a means of assimilating diverse children and inculcating American ideals. Id. at
62. In Meyer, for example, the State of Nebraska argued that compulsory public education
would educate children such that "the sunshine of American ideals [would] permeate the life
of the future citizens of the republic." Id. at 73 (citing Brief of Defendant in Error at 15,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)). In both Meyer and Pierce, the Court explicitly
recognized this struggle and made clear which position it endorsed. In Meyer, the Court
recounted Plato's ideal of common childrearing and Sparta's barracks for training and
education of children, but then rejected the "desire of the legislature to foster a homogenous
people." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02. Similarly, the Pierce Court dismissed the "general
power of the State to standardize its children." Pierce,268 U.S. at 535. Opponents of these
efforts at assimilation characterized them as tantamount to state totalitarianism, contrary to
both democratic ideals and parental authority. See Abrams, supra, at 69.
21 See Anne C. Dailey, ConstitutionalPrivacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REv.
955, 959 (1993). More contemporarily, the Court has rejected the "statist notion that
governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases." Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
22 See Fineman, Cracking the FoundationalMyths, supra note 5, at 179-80; Martha
Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty, Introduction to Part V."Economics and Intimacy:
Gendered Economic Roles and the Regulation of Intimate Relationships, in FEMINISM
CONFRONTS HoMo ECONOMicus: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 401, 401
[hereinafter Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction to Part V]; Dailey, supra note 21, at .96368; Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 123.
23 Prince,321 U.S. at 166. The economic context during which these norms developed
considered private rights central, and government intervention exceptional. During the
Lochner era, economic rights were paramount. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58
(1905). The right to contract was considered an essential private right, and the market was
the primary means of ordering society. Government intervention in these private rights was
suspect as an infringement on fundamental individual liberties-unhelpful and unwelcome.
See Dailey, supra note 21, at 971-72.
20
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Fourteenth Amendment is now read to protect the most personal of decisions, those
concerning family, parenthood, and intimate relationships, in the most personal of
spaces-the literal and figurative "home. ' 24 Childcare provided by family in the
home fits neatly inside these parameters.
Third, family privatization norms that police the limits of state responsibility
promote a hands-off approach to childcare. American family law reflects a strong
policy preference for individual and family dependency, rather than state
dependency. This preference is expressed in a variety of family law contexts, from
rules about property distribution and alimony to those governing child support.
Generally, the system operates to steer family members toward each other for
material support-and sets up default rules to secure that result-rather than looking
to the state. Thus, the private family is responsible for the care of its own members,
including care for children; state support is a last resort.
Finally, cultural values complicate privacy-based resistance to state interaction
with childcare. 26 Childcare, ana the state's relationship to it, is controversial because
it threatens entrenched values. 27 "Privacy" is invoked as cover for a number of other
28
ideological goals. Policy positions act as proxies for views about working mothers,
family forms, and the role of the government-both state and federal2 9 in family
culture wars ensure that childcare is a lightning rod for
life. 30 Our ongoing
31
controversy.
Viewed against this backdrop, it's not surprising that our norms and values
about childcare remain deeply resistant to-and skeptical of-state intervention.
Privacy and nonintervention norms have both reflected and reinforced the idea that
childcare is a private matter, involving private prerogatives, provided in the private

24 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); Dailey, supra note 21, at 962. The evolution of the family
privacy or liberty doctrine is not without its critics. Professor Dean Meyer, for example,
characterizes the body of cases as a "loosely recognized constellation of 'family privacy'
rights" with no "cohesive theory that might tie these rights together." Meyer, supra note 11,
at 528.
25 See Fineman, Cracking the FoundationalMyths, supra note 5, at 184-85; see also
Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies?Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y
REV. 3, 25 (2010) (characterizing "private" family law as a part of the social insurance
system).
26 Indeed, the issue causes such discomfort and controversy precisely because it rests
at the nexus of private versus public responsibility for childcare. BRUCE FULLER,
STANDARDIZING CHILDHOOD: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL STRUGGLE OVER EARLY
EDUCATION 71 (2007); Harbach, supra note 2, at 258-62; Deborah Phillips & Edward Zigler,

The Checkered History of FederalChild Care Regulation, 14 REV. REs. EDUC. 3 (1987).
27 FULLER, supra note 26, at 71; Phillips & Zigler, supra note 26, at 3, 9.
28
EDWARD ZIGLER ET AL., THE TRAGEDY OF CHILD CARE IN AMERICA 14-17 (2009).
29SALLY S. COHEN, CHAMPIONING CHILDCARE 251-52, 286 (2001); ZIGLER ET AL.,
supra note 28, at 54.
30 ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 28, at 61; Phillips & Zigler, supra note 26, at 9.
31See Harbach, supra note 2, at 259-62; ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 28, at 61, 132.
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home, and a matter of private responsibility. 32 These norms animated historical
debates over the proper state role in childcare, 33 and continue to influence them
today.34
Having explored how privacy norms have shaped the state's relationship to
childcare, I turn now to examine how well they map onto modem American
childcare. While an emphasis on privacy may historically have been consonant with
32 ALISON CLARKE-STEWART & VIRGINIA D. ALLHUSEN, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT

CHILDCARE 32 (2005); Abby J. Cohen, A BriefHistory of FederalFinancingfor Child Care
in the United States, FUTURE CHILD., Summer/Fall 1996, at 26, 27, available at
http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/06 02 01.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/Q6HF-B3MZ; Phillips & Zigler, supra note 26, at 3.
13 For example, in the early twentieth century, debates over compulsory public
education and child labor protections raised the specter of a "communistic effort to
nationalize children." Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1066 (1992) (quoting
WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE, THE CHILD LABOR AMENDMENT: ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO
RATIFICATION PREPARED FOR SUBMISSION TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW

YORK 36 (1934)). The 1930's White House Conference on Children reassured: "No one
should get the idea that Uncle Sam is going to rock the baby to sleep." Cohen, supra note
32, at 27 (citation omitted). In the early 1970s, then-president Richard M. Nixon vetoed
universal childcare legislation, cautioning, "for the Federal Government to plunge headlong
financially into supporting child development would commit the vast moral authority of the
National Government to the side of communal approaches to child rearing over against the
family-centered approach." Veto of the Economic Opportunities Amendments of 1971, 1
PUB. PAPERS 1174, 1178 (Dec. 9, 1971), availableat http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?
pid=3251, archived at http://perma.cc/P4UH-9UE9. Instead, President Nixon remarked,
"My one conviction is that the Federal Government's role wherever possible should be one
of assisting parents to purchase needed day care services in the private, open market." Cohen,
supra note 32, at 32 (citation omitted). Again in 1976, opponents of the Child and Family
Services Act warned that it would "Sovietize" childhood education and maintained that it
"would force parents to turn over their children to government run centers-virtually making
their children the wards of the State." 122 CONG. REC. 3802-03 (1976) (statement of Sen.
Birch Bayh). In the 1980s and early 1990s, despite aggressive efforts pressed by a coalition
of prominent childcare advocates, legislative efforts to generate increased supports for
childcare were unsuccessful, based in large part on strong preferences for retaining childcare
as a "family" matter, rather than one for the federal government. CLARKE-STEWART &
ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 39. Later in the 1990s, consensus grew at the federal level that
the government had a role in childcare policymaking. Cohen, supra note 32, at 20.
3 Contemporary critics of schools as "all-purpose social service centers" continue the
refrain, worrying that "[t]he logical end point is the system of ancient Sparta, with children
living in government barracks." See David Wagner, The Family and the Constitution,FIRST
THINGS,
http://www.firstthings.com/article/l 994/08/the-family-and-the-constitution,
archived at http://perma.cc/R7QH-ALGB (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). And it's no
coincidence that recent childcare initiatives have provoked charges of an emerging "nanny
state." Lindsey M. Burke & Lisa Snell, Commentary: Beware of Childcarefrom the Nanny
State, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Jan. 27, 2014, 12:02 AM), http://savannahnow.com/

column/2014-01-27/commentary-beware-childcare-nanny-state, archivedat http://perma.cc
/5WG4-BNH3.
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most childcare in the United States, it no longer squares with today's childcare
realities.
B. The Evolution of Childcare:From Insourcing to Outsourcing

The state's historical understanding of its relationship to childcare arose during
an era in which relatively few children received care outside the home and family.
For much of the twentieth century, outsourced childcare remained the exception35
rather than the rule, and nonintervention norms were consistent with this reality.
State intervention in and support for childcare tended to be modest and typically
came about in response to perceptions that either particular families, or the country
more broadly, were in crisis. 36 In response to these crises, support ebbed and flowed
rather than rising steadily. 37 But the number of children in nonparental or familial
end of the
care rose precipitously alongside dramatic demographic shifts toward the
38
twentieth century, putting pressure on the state's limited historical role.
The earliest childcare services were provided by "day nurseries" in the first half
of the nineteenth century, primarily to care for children of working-class immigrant
families in which mothers worked outside the home. 39 As day nurseries gradually
expanded among working-class families in the early twentieth century, 40 "nursery
schools" appeared across the United States to provide enrichment opportunities for
the children of wealthier families, and social and developmental education for their
mothers.

41

Outsourced care in day nurseries and nursery schools remained limited into the
early 1900s, and then rose sporadically in response to challenges at the national
level.42 During the fallout from the Great Depression in the 1930s, childcare became
attractive as a means of job creation.43 President Franklin D. Roosevelt allocated
federal funds for childcare via the Work Projects Administration (WPA) in 1933,
and by 1937, more than nineteen hundred day nurseries were providing childcare. 44
Those numbers declined again with the end of the WPA in 1938, and remained low
until World War 11. 45 During the war, the need for women's labor in war-related
industries led to renewed federal funding for day nurseries, and more than 1.5
million children were in childcare by 1945.46 But this surge, too, was short-lived,
& ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 27-28, 42.
Cohen, supra note 32, at 26-27.
17 See id.
38 See Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 124-27, 138-39.
'9 CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 27-28.
35 See CLARKE-STEWART
36 See

The first day nursery opened in 1838; by 1898, about 175 day nurseries existed in the
United States and the National Federation of Day Nurseries was created. Id. at 28.
41 Id. at 30.
42 Id. at 28-29.
43 Id. at 29.
40

Id.
Id.
46 Id.
44
45
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and by 1950 only eighteen thousand children were in centers-approximately 1% of
the enrollment five years earlier. 7 Between 1950 and 1965, 48childcare again
dwindled to primarily serve poor families perceived to be in crisis.
But past the midpoint of the twentieth century, privacy and nonintervention
norms were increasingly diverging from childcare realities. By the late 1960s, day
nurseries and nursery schools were converging as families increasingly grew
interested in accessing childcare services. 49 Between 1965 and 1975, the number of
children enrolled in licensed childcare doubled, and "enrollment in nursery schools
and voluntary kindergartens increased" by almost as much. 50 The period from the
1970s to the end of the twentieth century saw these numbers expand even more
exponentially. In 1977, about 4.3 million children under six received nonmaternal
care for significant periods of time, and that figure jumped to 8.8 million in fewer
than ten years. 5' By 1997, the exception had become the rule, with 63% of young
children in regular childcare arrangements, 52and by the turn of the century, that
number was up to 68% of children under six.
Recent figures report that 34.4 million families in the United States- 53
approximately 43% of all families-include children under eighteen-years-old.
Within these families, nonparental childcare is the norm for most of them. 54 The
primary categories of nonfamily care are center-based childcare, "family childcare"
provided in a private residence other than the child's, and care provided in the child's
home.

55

Thus, today the market provides a significant portion of care (roughly onethird) for America's young children.56 But, as discussed above, assumptions about
who cares (or who should care) for children, and norms about state involvement,
have been sticky and resistant to change. The privacy and nonintervention norms
that seemed coherent when children principally received care at home have become
increasingly incoherent in the face of this changed reality. Yet no new consensus on
at 29-30.
Id. at 30.
49 See id. at 30-31.
50
Id. at31.
47 Id.

48

51 Id.

Id.
" Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment
Characteristics of Families News Release (Apr. 25, 2014), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/Q3 SD-FC7H.
5' For example, in 2011, 3.5% of children under five received care from their mothers,
and 17.8% received care from their fathers. Another 33.7% received care from other
52

relatives, and 32.9% received nonrelative care.

LYNDA LAUGHLIN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
WHO'S MINDING THE KIDS? CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS: SPRING 2011, at 2 tbl.1 (2013)
[hereinafter CENSUS], available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p70-135.pdf,

archivedat http://perma.cc/CD4Z-HLJE. Among children under five, 38.7% had no regular

care arrangement. Id.
5' Child Care and Development Fund, 24 C.F.R. § 98.2 (2014) (defining "categories of

care").

56 See CENSUS, supra note

54, at 2 tbl. 1.
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what the state role in childcare should be-or why-has emerged to replace the nowanachronistic focus on privacy and nonintervention.
What result? Unlike many other developed, industrialized countries, as a whole
the United States has made no sustained public commitment to supporting early
childhood education and care. No consensus exists as to a set of priorities or
principles on which to ground the state's childcare law and policies.5" Nor is there a
comprehensive system for funding, regulating, or facilitating quality childcare in the
United States. 58 Instead, the general approach has been piecemeal and narrowly
focused, yielding a patchwork of funding and regulatory programs from multiple
and sometimes overlapping59 sources. And it impacts only a fraction of the families
that need or use childcare.
Disarray at the law and policy level is accompanied by dysfunction on the
ground. I turn next to investigate the state of American childcare, and to explain how
problems of quality and information have combined to yield childcare that falls well
below the social optimum.
C. The ChildcareMarket

Existing law and policy have lagged behind the realities of American childcare.
It should come as no' 60surprise, then, that America's childcare market is "chaotic" and
"poorly organized.
Experts and advocates regularly call attention to American
childcare's profound shortcomings. They characterize it as a "problem" 6 1 at best, a

7 See ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 28, at XVI; Cohen, supra note 32, at 36. A growing
awareness of the importance of childcare, however, is evidenced in the recent reforms to the
Child Care Development Fund program. See infra Part IV.D.
58 See CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 32.
19 See Cohen, supra note 32, at 26; Phillips & Zigler, supra note 26, at 4. But to say the
state approach has been ad hoc and incoherent is not to imply the state has done nothing at
all. Despite its ambivalence, the state has acted pragmatically-if insufficiently-in

childcare. I evaluate the sufficiency of existing state law and policy in Part IV, infra.

Rebecca M. Blank & Cordelia W. Reimers, Economics, Policy Analysis, and
Feminism, in FEMINIST ECONOMICS TODAY: BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN 157, 165 (Marianne
60

A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 2003).

61 DAVID M. BLAU, THE CHILD CARE PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 3

(2001). As

summed up by Blau:

Depending on whom you ask, the child care problem endangers the well-being of
children, causes financial hardship and stress for families, makes it next to
impossible for low-income families to work their way off welfare, causes
substantial productivity losses to employers, and prevents many mothers from

maintaining productive careers in the labor force.

670 ..

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No. 3

"national scandal," a "tragedy," 62 and the "most serious problem[] for children in
our society, '' 63 at worst.
Quality of care is the central concern. Although views differ as to what
constitutes quality childcare, 64 for experts, the definition is straightforward and
uncontroversial: quality childcare should, at a minimum, meet children's social,
cognitive, physical, and emotional needs. 65 Developmental childcare is
characterized as providing "safe and healthful care, developmentally appropriate
stimulation, positive interactions with adults, encouragement of the child's
individual66emotional growth, and promotion of positive relationships with other
children."
The overall quality provided in today's market is low, as measured by both
"process quality" (the affective, interpersonal dynamics of childcare interactions)
and "structural quality" (the logistical details of childcare organization).67 Quality
varies from state to state, and family to family. 68 Parents have little information
about the indicators of quality care, few resources to assist them in locating it, and
difficulty monitoring care when they find it. 69 When surveying data on the quality
of all childcare settings in the United States, the adjective most frequently

See generally ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 28, at XV (noting the childcare situation is
a tragedy because "we have all the knowledge that is needed, yet that knowledge is not
incorporated into what we know").
63 Stuart Oskamp, The Editor's Page, 47 J. SOC. ISSUES, Summer 1991.
62

64
65

See id. at 1.
Id. at 1-2.

66 Id. at 9. Dr. Edward Zigler and his colleagues view developmental care as a
"pragmatic compromise" between custodial care that does nothing more than keep children
safe while parents work, and comprehensive care, which works with children and parents to
provide for a range of children's needs beyond standard care. Id. at 67.
67 BLAU, supra note 61, 5-6, 125-26. Process quality and structural quality are two
separate measures of quality in the child development literature. Id. at 125-26; CLARKESTEWART & ALLHUSEN, supranote 32, at 39-40. Process quality or qualitative features look
to the dynamics of children's interactions in their childcare environments-with their
caregivers, and with other children. BLAU, supra note 61, at 126; CLARKE-STEWART &
ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 39-40. Structural quality refers to the various specific features
of a particular childcare environment, things like child-staff ratio, group size, teacher
education and training, safety, staffing issues, and program administration. BLAU, supra note
61, at 126; CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 39-40. Child development
research indicates the dynamic, process quality of care is most determinative of child
outcomes. But process quality is difficult to measure. Structural features of care are more
accessible barometers and thus act as proxies for process quality. BLAU, supra note 61, at
126-27. Accordingly, a standard measure of childcare quality is whether it meets the types
of structural standards established by accreditation organizations like the National
Association of Education for Young Children (NAEYC) or by state licensing authorities. Id.
at 126.
68 CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 35, at 32.
69

Id.
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encountered is "mediocre." 70 While quality ranges from poor to excellent depending
on setting, there is too little high-quality care in each type of childcare arrangement,
and the problem appears to be intensifying. 7' And though there is tremendous
that from a child development
variation among childcare settings, studies indicate
72
passable.
than
better
no
is
it
of
most
perspective,
In childcare centers, most care is graded as either medium or poor, and poor
care is even more characteristic for infants and toddlers than for preschoolers. 73 As
troubling as these statistics are, quality is likely even lower in unlicensed family
childcare homes and other settings.74 One study of unregulated, nonrelative homes
found "good" care in 3% of settings, "adequate" care in 47%, and "inadequate" care
in 50%. 75 Of particular concern, because these settings are unregulated, there is no
oversight for basic health and safety, no training to foster child development, and no
settings are
way to monitor the overall quality of care.76 Consequently, these
77
practically invisible to regulators, researchers, and policymakers.
And problems with the childcare market aren't limited to quality. Childcare
consumers-parents and families-face multiple challenges in accessing the
affordable, high-quality childcare they might prefer. Studies indicate they lack
important information relevant to childcare. 78 Parents frequently do not appreciate
important differences between high- and low-quality care, and they have difficulty
locating the level and type of care they prefer. 79 Nor are they able to monitor

supra note 61, at 4-5; Naci Mocan, Can
Empirical Analysis of Information Asymmetry in the
POPULATION ECON. 743, 744 (2007); LIKE THE MILITARY,
71 CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32,
70 BLAU,

Consumers Detect Lemons? An
Market for Child Care, 20 J.
supra note 1, at 6.
at 60; J. LEE KREADER ET AL.,

NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, CHILD CARE & EARLY EDUCATION RESEARCH
CONNECTIONS: INFANT AND TODDLER CHILD CARE QUALITY 5 (2005), available at

http://www.researchconnections.org/childcare/resources/6872/pdf, archivedat http://perna.
cc/QD7S-JUXY.
72 BLAU, supra note 61, at 4; CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 6062; ELIZABETH PALLEY & COREY S. SHDAIMAH, IN OUR HANDS: THE STRUGGLE FOR U.S.
CHILD CARE POLICY 128-31 (2014); ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 28, at 9-10.
73 KREADER ET AL., supra note 71, at 4.
7' BLAU, supra note 61, at 5; KREADER ET AL., supra note 71, at 4.
15 KREADER ET AL., supra note 71, at 4.
76 CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILDCARE 8, 11
(2012) [hereinafter PARENTS], available at http://www.naccrra.org/sites/default/files/default
site pages/2012/cost report 2012_final_081012 0.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/CDX9
-3VJP.
77 CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 60-61; PARENTS, supra note 76,
at 8.
78 Child Care and Development Fund Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,442, 29,443 (May 20,
2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 98) (noting several studies considered in the Child Care
and Development Fund rulemaking aimed, in part, at "providing parents with the transparent
information they need to find [quality] care").
79 See BLAU, supra note 61, at 7, 9.
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whether, in fact, the care their children receive is generally of high quality.8 ° What
is more, less formal types of care such as in-home nannies, babysitters, and family
childcare are less visible to families because they are not typically accessible via
directories, listings, and databases. 81 These information gaps frustrate families'
attempts to secure childcare of the type, quality, cost, and location they prefer. And
beyond quality and information,
many working families struggle to afford ever82
rising childcare costs.

In sum, childcare in America is foundering. Quality is generally low, and
parents lack the information and resources necessary to access it. Moreover, our
childcare crisis does not impact all families equally. Low-income families are
especially vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the childcare market because of
limitations on what they can afford. Widening income gaps between low- and highincome families are correlated with differential investments in young children's
cognitive development, likely contributing to our widening, income-based
achievement gap.83
Given the divide between theory and reality-and the problems endemic in our
childcare system-how might we reassess and reimagine the state's role? We can
begin by recognizing that childcare is, for many families, a service bought and sold
on a market rather than provided in the home by family members. 84 Economic
analysis would determine the state's role, at least in part, based on whether the
market is producing satisfactory outcomes. That recognition is the impetus for the
discussion that follows.
III. CHILDCARE MARKET FAILURE

As currently configured, the state's orientation toward childcare-an
anachronistic model of childcare and privacy that no longer reflects the actual
experiences of many American families-is incongruent with the realities of today's
childcare market. Microeconomics, the study of how people make market choices

80

See id. at 9.

& ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 59.
A recent study by Child Care Aware of America, a nonprofit childcare advocacy
group, reports that in more than half the states, center-based infant care costs more than
tuition and fees at a public college. PARENTS, supra note 76, at 16, 47-47 app.6; see also
81 CLARKE-STEWART
82

Emily Alpert Reyes, Report: Child Care Costs More Than College in Much of U.S., L.A.

(Nov. 4, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/04/business/la-fi-mo-childcarecosts-college-20131104, archivedat http://perma.cc/4TFL-37JQ.
TIMES

See Sean F. Reardon, The Widening Academic Achievement Gap Between the Rich
and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible Explanations, in WHITHER- OPPORTUNITY?:
RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES 91, 105 (Greg J. Duncan &
83

Richard J. Mumane eds., 2011).
84 BLAU, supra note 61, at 5.
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and the effects of those choices,8 5 provides insights into how the86 childcare market
functions, and how it is (or could be) affected by law and policy.

In this Part, I use economic theory to understand today's childcare market and
assess its performance. I begin by explaining how market failure contributes to
dysfunction in our childcare market, and then explore the implications for state
intervention. I end by revisiting the theoretical basis for the state's role in childcare
and propose a market-based model as one fruitful approach.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Economic Analysis

Before embarking an economic analysis of the childcare market in depth, I
qualify how I am using economic analysis, and to what ends.
Many feminist scholars are critical of economic theory, some going so far as to
intimate that it is "eutrophic," 87 colonizing and overshadowing other intellectual
traditions. 88 There is something distasteful in thinking about children, families, and
caring more generally in market terms. 89 Feminist critics of neoclassical economic
models have characterized the mixture of family, feminism, and economics as
"oxymoronic" 90 and "revolt[ing]." 91 And there is deep dispute about whether a
market for childcare should even exist, 92 accompanied by concerns that treating
85 ROBERT H. FRANK & BEN

2008).

86 BLAU, supra note
87 See Douglas A.

S. BERNANKE,

PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOM IcS

4(4th ed.

61, at 64.
Kysar, Feminism and Eutrophic Methodologies, in

FEMINISM

CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 94, 101.
88 See, e.g., Blank & Reimers, supra note 60, at 158; Brinig, supra note 4, at 450; Neil

H. Buchanan, Playing with Fire: FeministLegal Theorists and the Tools of Economics, in
4, at
61, 61, 90; Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Contractingfor Care, in FEMINIST ECONOMICS
TODAY: BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 60, at 61, 62 [hereinafter England & Folbre,
FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note

Contracting];Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty, Introduction to FEMINISM
CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at ix, xvi, xvii
[hereinafter Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction].
89 See Kysar, supra note 87, at 98; Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Who Should Pay
for the Kids?, 563 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCI. 194, 196 (1999)
[hereinafter England & Folbre, Who Should Pay]; Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 129-30;
Harbach, supra note 2, at 276-77.
90 Brinig, supra note 4, at 450.
91Id. at 458.
92 See Harbach, supra note 2, at 259-62. Rather than staking a position on whether
parents should outsource childcare, I maintain this decision is one made best by individuals
and parents, rather than society or the state. See id.at 299. Certainly, there are aspects of
family-based care that are not commensurable with market goods and services, and we must
be mindful of the distinction between those aspects of care that are appropriate for
outsourcing, and those that are not. Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 85; see also Folbre & Nelson,
supra note 9, at 137; Harbach, supra note 2, at 276-78. Yet feminists generally are wary of
facile dichotomies like "care" versus "profit," and recognize that caregiving can involve both
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childcare
as a commodity will "crowd out" feelings of love, altruism, and genuine
93
care.
What is more, the use of neoclassical economics as a tool to evaluate and shape
public policy (especially its application to nonmarket behavior94 ) has been subject
to extensive critique along a variety of axes, 95 from basic assumptions and methods9 6

altruistic and self-interested motivations, and feminist scholars have recognized that public
childcare can exist in a "rich" market in which financial exchange is only one aspect of a
complex relationship among children, parents, and childcare providers. Paula England,
Separative and Soluble Selves: Dichotomous Thinking in Economics, in FEMINISM
CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 32, 32-33,
48; Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 123, 129-3 1. These same economists warn, however,
against a shift from "rich" to "thinner" childcare markets. Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at
137.
13 Estin, supra note 4, at 28; Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 130; Silbaugh, supra
note 4, at 84. Of course, as my colleague, Professor Erik Craft points out, the same could be
said of soldiers, ministers, and physicians, but few would argue that we shouldn't pay them.
14 Myra H. Strober, Feminist Economics: Implications for Education, in FEMINISM.
CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 261, 279;
Estin, supra note 4, at 1, 8.
95 Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction, supra note 88, at ix, xv.
96 Many scholars are uneasy or even hostile to economic analysis and the freight that
accompanies it. At a foundational level, neoclassical economic analysis defines value by the
willingness-to-pay principle, which suggests that everything can be commodified and
measured in money. Buchanan, supra note 88, at 64-66. With economic efficiency and utility
as barometers of well-being, neoclassical economics may not be well suited to consider the
well-being of parents, children, and families, and the trade-offs between varying categories,
and also ignores other potential measures of value. See id.; Strober, supra note 94, at 26465, 274-75. Critics also charge the foundational assumptions and analysis of neoclassical
economics-rational utility maximizers interacting in a world of perfect competition, perfect
access to information, and zero transactions costs-are distorting and gendered, neglecting
the more relational aspects of the human experience: dependency, altruism, and care. See,
e.g., Buchanan, supra note 88, at 74; England & Folbre, Contracting,supra note 88, at 6263; Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson, Introduction to FEMINIST ECONOMICS TODAY:
BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 60, at 1, 1; Fineman, Cracking the Foundational
Myths, supra note 5, at 182; Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction, supra note 88, at xvi;
Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 123, 131-32. Although these economic canons frequently
are invoked as if they were literally true, they are in fact contested and at best an
approximation of true market behavior. Buchanan, supra note 88, at 69-71, 74, 89; Terence
Dougherty, Economic Rhetoric, Economic Individualism, and the Law and Economics
School, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra
note 4, at3, 12.
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to normative implications.97 Critics of this model consider it morally suspect and
incompatible with socially progressive projects.98
Despite these limitations, a number of scholars see the potential for economic
models to bring fresh analytic methods and insights to feminist and other projects. 99
Economic discourse is not only accessible and politically salient; l °0° it can also be
co-opted to achieve ends other than those traditionally associated with the
neoclassical economic project. Feminist scholars in a variety of disciplines have
deployed economic theory critically, reconceptualizing canonical economic
analysis need not be-and in
principles to yield powerful new insights. 10 1 Economic
02
goals.1
feminist
with
not-incompatible
is
this case

97 See Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction, supra note 88, at xv. For those skeptical of
the model, the scientific veneer of neoclassical economics is especially troubling. Economist
and law professor Neil Buchanan characterizes the supposed scientific rigor of neoclassical
economics as "a mirage ... miscalibrated and easily misused." Buchanan, supra note 88, at
62. Rather than objectively positivist, these critics claim that neoclassical economics is in
fact normative, based on normative assumptions, and used to achieve normative ends.
Buchanan, supra note 88, at 63; Dougherty, supra note 96, at 4; Martha Albertson Fineman
& Terence Dougherty, Introduction to Part : Law and Economics and Neoclassical
Economic Theory, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND
SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 1, 1-2; Kysar, supra note 87, at 95. Equally troubling are certain
issues on which neoclassical economics claims to be agnostic: existing allocations of wealth,
resources, and power. Within neoclassical economics, distribution is an ethical and political
problem, not one of efficiency. NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 25, 27, 51 (2d ed. 2006).
98 See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 88, at 62, 87.
99 See Blank & Reimers, supra note 60, at 158; Martha T. McCluskey, Deconstructing
the State-Market Divide: The Rhetoric of Regulationfrom Workers' Compensation to the
World Trade Organization, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW,
AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 147, 147-49, 170 [hereinafter McCluskey, Deconstructing];
Estin, supra note 4, at 10; Kysar, supra note 87, at 94, 99; Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 82, 121.
100 See McCluskey, Deconstructing,supra note 99, at 170; Kysar, supra note 87, at 99,
100-01.
101 See, e.g., England, supra note 92, at 48-49; England & Folbre, Capitalism, supra
note 8, at 29; England & Folbre, Contracting,supra note 88, at 62, 70-71; Fineman &
Dougherty, Introduction to Part V, supra note 22, at 402; Nancy Folbre, Valuing Care, in
FOR LOVE AND MONEY: CARE PROVISION IN THE UNITED STATES 92, 93, 106-07 (Nancy
Folbre ed., 2012) [hereinafter Folbre, Valuing Care]; McCluskey, Deconstructing,supra
note 99, at 170; McCluskey, Politicsof Economics, supra note 6, at 199-200, 202, 215, 217,
220; Strober, supra note 94, at 263; England & Folbre, Who Should Pay, supra note 89, at
200, 202; Estin, supra note 4, at 11; Nancy Folbre, Children as Public Goods, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 86, 86, 89 (1994) [hereinafter Folbre, Public Goods]; Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9,
at 137; Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 95. It is from this tradition that my project proceeds.
102 To the contrary, I consider this project to be very much consistent with feminist
goals. Most of the early economic theorizing on which I rely was put forth by feminist
economic pioneers. See infra note 123 and accompanying text. What is more, by
complicating the neoclassical ideal of a "perfect market," the analysis below leaves room
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What might we gain by turning the economic lens to our childcare market?
Limitations notwithstanding, the economic model is a systematic, diagnostic and
prescriptive tool for law and policymaking, enabling us to examine and forecast
market imperfections, and to consider and predict the effects of various policy
approaches.10 3 In particular, "thinking like an economist" surely brings a number of
important insights to the childcare market: market actors respond to incentives,10 4
opportunity costs-and thus trade-offs--exist, and investments should be made
where they will be most beneficial.' Economics, then,
brings the possibility of new
10 6
perspectives and innovative solutions to childcare.
But importantly, in taking on this project, I don't mean to reduce the challenges
and complexities of American childcare to a simple market problem.' 0 7 Economic
analysis is not a complete answer to the challenges I describe in Part II, and
distributional issues associated with income inequality are an especially pressing

for, and in fact emphasizes, community and collective goods. See Brinig, supra note 4, at
456.
Blank & Reimers, supra note 60, at 158-61.
104 Although childcare offers intrinsic rewards, it is nevertheless subject to market
incentives. England & Folbre, Capitalism,supra note 8, at 31.
105 Strober, supra note 94, at 283.
106 See Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 97, 109.
107 Blank & Reimers, supra note 60, at 165. We intuitively understand that childcareeven when provided for monetary exchange-has both market and nonmarket components.
See Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 132; Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 94. It is also clear that
103

our childcare system is beset by a number of challenges, only some of which the market
model can speak to. See England & Folbre, Capitalism,supra note 8, at 30; Harbach, supra
note 2, at 299-301. The economic model is one way of understanding our childcare
dilemmas, but certainly not the only one. In particular, questions of efficiency are not and
ought not be the only values at stake in childcare. BLAU, supra note 61, at 27, 162. Efficiency
is, at most, an adjunct to other values and concerns that animate these debates: equality of
opportunity, fairness, morality, dependency, and vulnerability. See Blank & Reimers, supra
note 60, at 165; Buchanan, supra note 88, at 86; Fineman, Crackingthe FoundationalMyths,

supra note 5, at 182-83.
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concern.10 8 My aim here is to mine economic theory for insights,0 9but not to preempt
other important conversations in our discourse about childcare.
With these caveats in mind, I turn now to explore what economic analysis can
teach us about the conditions and potential in our childcare market.
B. DiagnosingChildcareMarket Failure
The touchstone for neoclassical market analysis is efficiency-a state in which
all goods and services are produced and consumed at socially optimal levels, such
that individual and societal well-being are maximized." 0 Adam Smith's theory of
the "invisible hand" states the default, aspirational model of efficient markets: in
perfectly competitive markets, self-interested behavior of buyers and sellers produce
outcomes that maximize societal benefit and generate no waste."' In this theoretical
1
world of perfect markets, little if any government intervention is needed. 2
The neoclassical model assumes an initial distribution of property rights to which
will
be unequal access across the population, but takes no position on the fairness of
there
that initial distribution. Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty, Introduction to
PartII.Feminism Confronts Neoclassical Economic Theory and Law and Economics, in
FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY, supra note 4, at
57, 57-58 [hereinafter Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction to Part II]; MERCURO &
MEDEMA, supra note 97, at 25; DIANE PAULSELL, MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, THE
ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR INVESTING IN CHILDREN: A Focus ON CHILD CARE 29, 44, 4849 (2001)
[hereinafter INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT], available at
http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/-/media/publications/PDFs/econrationale.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/X3ZD-LUMY. Thus, market efficiency can coexist with stark inequality,
and efficiency analysis tends to prefer the status quo. Buchanan, supra note 88, at 85;
Dougherty, supra note 96, at 6; Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction, supra note 88, at ix-x;
Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction to Part II, supra, at 57-58; MERCURO & MEDEMA,
supra note 97, at 48; Kysar, supra note 87, at 96. Although economists are not typically
comfortable making distributive arguments, the pursuit of fairness and justice via
redistribution is an especially compelling justification for state involvement in the context of
childcare. Government intervention in childcare can serve to advance equal opportunity for
all children in our society. INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra 66-68, 88; DEBORAH
LOWE VANDELL & BARBARA WOLFE, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, CHILD CARE
QUALITY: DOES IT MATTER AND DOES IT NEED TO BE IMPROVED? 81 (2000), available at
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/sr/pdfs/sr78.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C42RZ9Q5.
109 See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 83-84, 88, 95 (discussing how both economic
and emotional understandings can and should coexist).
108

& BERNANKE, supra note 85, at 86.
DOUGLAS BERNHEIM & MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, MICROECONOMICS

110 FRANK

111
B.

496, 51718, 588 (2008); MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 97, at 21-22. These efficient outcomes
are "Pareto optimal," meaning "that resources cannot be reallocated so as to make one
individual better off without making [another] worse off." Id.; see also FRANK & BERNANKE,
supra note 85, at 176 (describing this economic theory as "Pareto efficiency").
112 Professors Mercuro and Medema outline the implications of such a perfect
market:
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. But of course, real-world markets often fail to achieve this ideal."13 Market
failure occurs when markets are inefficient-when they do not achieve or maintain
socially optimal allocative efficiency.114 Put another way, market failure occurs
when a market produces too much or too little of a good or service as compared to
what would be best from a societal perspective. 115 Markets can fail1 16because of
market power disparities, external effects, and incomplete information.
Although infrequently discussed in the legal literature,' 17 economists and social
scientists have given sustained study to the functioning and failings of the childcare
market, " 8 concluding that America's childcare market manifests multiple aspects of
market failure." 9 Given the data surveyed in Part II, these experts have concluded
the existence of externalities (or "spillovers") and information problems have caused
lower than optimal demand for high quality childcare, 120 leading the market to

If the world were as simple as that described by the perfectly competitive market,
then all we need do is to set in place the just and fair initial property rights
structure and, barring problems with information, enforcement, public goods, and
externalities, the market would provide us with an efficient allocation of resources
MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 97, at 51.
113Id.
4
11 DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1314 (2d ed. 2011); see also BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 621 (outlining the
ways in which market failure can occur); FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 85, at 298

(examining externalities as an example of what causes market failure); VANDELL & WOLFE,
supra note 108, at 78 (examining market failure in the context of childcare).

I"5 BLAU, supra note 61, at 10.

Id. at 10-11. The theory of market failure is not without its critics. See Richard 0.
Zerbe Jr. & Howard McCurdy, The End of Market Failure,23 REG. 10, 10 (2000).
117 But see generally McCluskey, Politics ofEconomics, supra note 6, at 202 (touching
on market failure in the context of childcare).
118 As economist David Blau observes:
116

As in the markets for most other goods and services, there is a wide range of
quality available and higher-quality care generally has a higher price. Consumers
of child care can usually find the quality of care they prefer if they are willing to
pay the price for such care. Providers can offer high-quality care if they choose,
incurring high costs but also commanding the high price that goes with such care,
or they can offer lower-quality care, at lower cost, and receive a lower price.
BLAU, supra note 61, at 5.
" 9 Id. at 10.

0 Economists have located market failure in the childcare context with demand. Id. at
12. Blau has found that a decrease in the price of childcare leads to an increased demand for
childcare quantity, but not quality. Id. at 83. Likewise, an increase in the mother's wage rate
increases the quantity of childcare demanded, but not the quality of care demanded. Id. And
childcare consumers appear to view quantity and quality as substitutes-quality tends to be
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produce too little of it. 121 The discussion that follows considers the causes of
childcare market failure in more detail.
1. ChildcareSpillovers
Feminist economists and sociologists were among the first to observe the
childcare market is imperfect in part because the benefits of childcare transactions
are not completely captured by families and childcare providers. 122 Instead,23 the
benefits of quality childcare spill over to society at large in a variety of ways.
Spillovers result when some costs or benefits of a transaction are not reflected
in the transaction itself, but are instead externalized to others. 24 In the case of
positive externalities, 125 if market actors cannot capture the full value of a particular

higher if quantity is lower. Id. at 14. Studies indicate that many consumers cannot or will not
pay for high-quality childcare, which leads to low demand for such care. Id. at 7-8; Mocan,
supra note 70, at 744. In fact, some parents could afford high-quality care rather than average
care but nevertheless choose average care. BLAU, supra note 61, at 7-8.
By contrast, experts have determined there is little problem with the internal
functioning of the childcare market in terms of supply. See BLAU, supra note 61, at 230-31.
Increased demand for childcare leads to a significant enough increase in supply that large
price increases are avoided. Id. at 14. The cost to providers of increasing childcare quality is
relatively modest, such that when the price of care rises, day care centers can and do improve
the quality of care they offer. Id. Thus, on the supply side, the childcare market appears to
function well in terms of expanding quantity and quality in response to increased demand.
Id. at 103.
121 BLAU, supra note 61, at 8, 159; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 78, 83.
"[T]he evidence strongly suggests that high-quality child care is not a high-priority item for
many households." BLAU, supra note 61, at 8.
122 One of the assumptions of a perfectly competitive, efficient market is that all costs
and benefits of a transaction are captured in the transaction itself, such that the marginal
individual benefits and costs of a transaction equal the marginal socialbenefits and costs of
a transaction. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 97, at 22. Yet utility maximization theory
in a market economy assumes that consumers consider only private costs and benefits. Id. at
60.
123 England, supra note 92, at 48-49; England & Folbre, Capitalism,supra note 8, at
29-32; England & Folbre, Contracting,supra note 88, at 70-71; Folbre, Valuing Care,supra
note 101, at 107-08; McCluskey, Politics of Economics, supra note 6, at 202; England &
Folbre, Who Should Pay, supra note 89, at 198; Folbre, Public Goods, supra note 101, at
86-88.
124 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, at 18.
125 Externalities can be both positive, generating benefits, and negative, generating
costs. BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 754; COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 114,
at 19-20. Education is widely believed to create positive externalities. BERNHEIM &
WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 759; BLAU, supra note 61, at 161; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra
note 108, at 86; INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 66. By contrast,
activities that create pollution are commonly cited as creating negative externalities, because
the underlying private market transactions do not fully account for the external costs created
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resource, they typically are unwilling to pay a price commensurate with its overall
value. Consumers won't demand or purchase as much of the resource as would be
socially optimal, 26 and the market price of the resource doesn't accurately reflect
its full societal benefits. 27 When these broader benefits are not accounted for in
market transactions, an underallocation of resources results. 128 Private benefits
diverge from public ones, and individual
market transactions do not lead to efficient
129
outcomes from a societal perspective.
There is no question that high quality childcare benefits children who receive
it, as well as their families. A robust body of child development literature establishes
that higher quality childcare significantly affects child development, leading to
improved cognitive and social outcomes for children.' 30 This data confirms that
by polluting the air or environment. See, e.g., BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at
-754.
126 McCluskey, Politics of Economics, supra note 6, at 202.
127 See England & Folbre, Capitalism,supra note 8, at 31.
128 MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 97, at 23, 61.
129 Folbre, Valuing Care, supra note 101, at 107.
130 Numerous studies of childcare's effects on quality of child development and
behavior confirm that high quality childcare supports children's social, emotional, and
cognitive development, and is especially beneficial for children raised in poverty. See BLAU,
supra note 61, at 129-30, 161; Nat'l Inst. of Child Health & Human Dev. Early Child Care
Research Network, Child-CareEffect Sizes for the NICHD Study of Early Child Care and
Youth Development,AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Feb.-Mar. 2006, at99, 113 [hereinafter Child-Care
Effect Sizes]; PARENTS, supra note 76, at 11; KREADER ET AL., supra note 71, at 2; VANDELL
& WOLFE, supra note 108, at 99-100.
The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) Early Child
Care Research Network has been the source of much burgeoning information on the longterm effects of childcare quality on child development and is considered to have produced
some of the most credible evidence of childcare effects because of its longitudinal design, its
inclusion of all types of childcare, and its analysis of a variety of factors external to childcare
that also affect development. BLAU, supranote 61, at 136. This study has followed a sample
of more than thirteen hundred children beginning in 1991 and monitors home and childcare
environments, as well as their development. Id. at 134. The most recent NICHD report
indicates that effects of high-quality childcare last well into the teenage years: children who
received high-quality early childcare scored higher in academic and cognitive tests and were
less likely to exhibit behavioral problems than were children who had lower-quality care.
Even ten years after leaving childcare, quality had an impact on academic achievement, and
this impact persisted not just for low-income children, but for middle-income and affluent
children, as well. See Deborah Lowe Vandell et al., Do Effects of Early Child Care Extend
to Age 15 Years? Results from the NICHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth
Development, 81 CHILD DEV. 737, 737-55 (2010).
Much of the underlying data on the broader societal benefits associated with early
childhood education and care come from two well-designed and oft-cited longitudinal
studies, the Perry Preschool Study (PPS) and the Carolina Abecedarian Program (CAP).
These two studies are thought to provide the "most reliable data" on the long-term societal
benefits of quality childcare. Heckman, supra note 131, at 19. The PPS followed fifty-eight
disadvantaged African American children who participated in an intensive preschool
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children who receive high quality childcare do markedly better than those who do
not, as measured by a variety of metrics: they are less likely to require remedial
education,' 3' more likely to graduate from high 4 school,1 32 less likely to commit
135
3
crimes, 133 less likely to be neglected or abused,' less likely to be unemployed,
program in Ypsilanti, Michigan, between 1962 and 1967, and followed the control and
treatment groups through age forty. HighScope Perry Preschool Study, HIGHSCOPE,
http://www.highscope.org/content.asp?contentid=219, archived at http://perma.cc/2VHAE5WK (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). The CAP studied 111 disadvantaged children who
participated in full-day interventions beginning at four months through eight years, and
followed these children through age twenty-one. The Abecedarian Project,THE CAROLINA
ABECEDARIAN PROJECT, http://abc.fpg.unc.edu!, archived at http://perma.cc/DVD2-RCE9
(last visited Jan. 16, 2015). Notably, the dramatic results of the PPS and CAP studies have
not been reproduced in the Head Start program, despite the high accolades Head Start
frequently receives. Some speculate that Head Start may in fact offer lower quality care in
terms of teacher education and programming, for example. See INVESTING IN CHILDREN
REPORT, supra note 108, at 99.
Not all who have analyzed the data find all studies to be persuasive. See BLAU, supra
note 61, at 6 (concluding that several studies were reliable enough to support claims of the
impact of childcare quality); see also Mocan, supra note 70, at 748 (noting that although
child development literature has not provided conclusive evidence on impact of quality on
development, there is strong positive association between quality and child outcomes).
'' COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF INVESTING IN HIGH-QUALITY
PRESCHOOL: USING EARLY EDUCATION TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE FISCAL
SUSTAINABILITY OF STATES AND THE NATION 20, 29 (2006) [hereinafter CED], availableat

https://www.ced.org/pdf/Economic-Promise-of-Investing-in-High-Quality-Preschool.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/7B8R-EYD8; James J. Heckman, Schools, Skills, and Synapses
90 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14064, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 4064.pdf?new window= 1, archivedat http://perma.cc/UKQ
8-TPX2 (illustrating 15% of PPS participants enrolled in special education, compared to 34%
of control group). To the extent high quality early childhood education and care improves
school readiness of children, it may also lead to increased teacher satisfaction and retention,
thus reducing costs related to teacher turnover, absenteeism, and substitutes. CED, supra, at
29.
132 Frances A. Campbell et al., Adult Outcomes as a Function of an Early Childhood
EducationalProgram:An Abecedarian ProjectFollow-Up, 48 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
1033, 1038 (2012) (finding 83% of CAPS participants graduated as opposed to 72% of
nonparticipants, and participants were also more likely to graduate from college); Heckman,
supra note 131, at 90 fig. 17 (showing 66% of PPS participants graduated from high school
on time, versus 45% of control group).
131 PPS participants had significantly fewer arrests and fewer months of incarceration.
David R. Katner, Delinquency and Daycare, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 49, 57-58 (2010);
Heckman, supra note 131, at 90. Additionally, an intensive program directed at low-income,
primarily African American families at Syracuse University was shown to decrease the
overall number, severity, and recurrence of later involvement with the juvenile justice
system. Katner, supra, at 58.
134 Katner, supra note 133, at 56-57; CED, supra note 131, at 22.
131 CED, supra note 131, at 22 (finding PPS participants more likely to be employed at
forty and had higher incomes); LAWRENCE J. SCHWEINHART ET AL., THE HIGH/SCOPE PERRY

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[No. 3

less likely to require public assistance, 136 less likely to become teen parents,1 37 and

are generally healthier.' 38 In short, exposure to higher-quality childcare leads to
better-educated and healthier children, who grow up to be more productive and
economically stable adults. And children and families eventually capture more of
these benefits as they become more productive. Childcare quality is especially
consequential for low-income families: for these vulnerable
children, both positive
39
and negative effects of childcare quality are magnified.1
Given the significance of these effects, it's not surprising that quality childcare
generates broader social spillovers 140-to neighbors, partners, future children,
colleagues, employers, and all who benefit from public expenditures derived from
the tax base. 14' An expanding cohort of economists have concluded that quality

PRESCHOOL STUDY THROUGH AGE 40: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FREQUENTLY ASKED

QUESTIONS 2 (2005), availableat http://www.highscope.org/file/Research/PerryProject/
specialsummary rev2011 02_2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S2T2-J332. The PPS
students also performed better on other indicators of economic stability, such as home
ownership, maintenance of a saving account, and financial independence. CED, supra note
131, at 22; SCHWEINHART ET AL., supra, at 2; Heckman, supra note 13 1, at 90.
136 Heckman, supra note 131, at 90.
"' CED, supra note 131, at 22 (finding CAP participants less likely to become teenage

parents).

138 PPS participants at forty were less likely to use prescription and illegal drugs, and
less likely to have stopped work because of health issues. CED, supra note 131, at 22. These
health gains are associated with better access to health screening, immunization, and
nutrition. See Clive R. Belfield, The Promise of Early ChildhoodEducationIntervention, in
THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION
200, 212 (Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007).
139 See CHILD CARE AWARE, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF CHILD CARE: 2014
REPORT 10, 24 (2014), available at http://www.usa.childcareaware.org/costofcare, archived
at http://perma.cc/6HDX-NBAN (follow "Download the Full Report" hyperlink).
Increasingly divergent investments in child development by class are correlated with
disparities in cognitive achievement, magnifying social inequality in ways that have negative
spillovers. See Reardon, supra note 83, at 105.
140 See England, supra note 92, at 48-49; England & Folbre, Contracting,supra note
88, at 70; Folbre, Valuing Care, supra note 101, at 93. 107; England & Folbre, Who Should
Pay, supra note 89, at 198; Folbre, Public Goods, supra note 101, at 98; Folbre & Nelson,
supra note 9, at 137. Despite a traditional focus on physical externalities (e.g., pollution),
economists are clear that social spillovers also exist in imperfect markets. England & Folbre,
Contracting,supra note 88, at 70.
"' England, supra note 92, at 48-49; England & Folbre, Contracting,supra note 88, at
62; Folbre, Valuing Care, supra note 101, at 107; Folbre, Public Goods, supra note 101, at
86. A number of scholars go further and argue that childcare creates human capital that
becomes a public good. That is, society at large can enjoy the benefits of this enhanced
human capital without directly paying for it, and can also enjoy these benefits without
diminishing their effects for others. See England, supra note 92, at 48-49; England & Folbre,
Who Should Pay, supra note 89, at 195, 199; Folbre, Public Goods, supra note 101, at 86;
INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 7.
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"social capital" in diffuse ways 142 but also generates
childcare not only enhances
43
1
benefits.
important fiscal
Growing research on human capital 144 weighs the costs and benefits of
childcare investments, providing an empirical model for understanding the
economic spillovers of quality care.' 45 The short-term benefits of quality care are
reflected in increased economic activity and development: a larger and more
47
146
productive workforce and increased economic activity in the childcare market.'
Longer-term payoffs include a more sophisticated future workforce, cost savings on
education, 48 crime prevention,149 social services and public assistance,' 50 and an
increased tax base. ' 51 These long-term benefits are so significant that Nobel laureate
economist James Heckman (and others) argue that investment in early childhood
education and care yields significant financial returns to society, 152 increasing
England & Folbre, Contracting,supra note 88, at 70; England & Folbre, Who Should
Pay, supra note 89, at 200.
143 England & Folbre, Contracting,supra note 88, at 70-71; England & Folbre, Who
Should Pay, supra note 89, at 200; Folbre, Valuing Care, supra note 101, at 93; Folbre &
Nelson, supra note 9, at 137. Not surprisingly, analyses identifying positive spillovers in the
childcare market mirror those concerning education in important ways. VANDELL & WOLFE,
supra note 108, at 86.
'4 "Human capital" comprises "marketable skills acquired through investments in
education and training." BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 360. Few economists
have included care in their analysis of human capital. Paula England & Nancy Folbre,
142

Reconceptualizing Human Capital, in THE MANAGEMENT OF DURABLE RELATIONS:

126
Nancy
England
and
Paula
(Jeroen Weesie & Werner Raub eds., 2000). Feminist economists
Folbre argue for a broadening of the usual understanding of human capital to include human
"capabilities"-physical functioning, cognitive functioning, self-regulation, and caring. Id.
at 126-28.
145 See Folbre, Valuing Care, supra note 101, at 107-08; see also supra note 130.
146 Access to childcare improves parental employment opportunities. Katner, supra
THEORETICAL MODELS IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF HOUSEHOLDS AND ORGANIZATIONS

note 133, at 62; CED, supra note 131, at 22.
14' BLAU, supra note 61, at 19; CED, supra note 131, at 31; LIKE THE MILITARY, supra
note 1, at 26-27.
141 CED, supra note 131, at 29; SCHWEINHART ET AL., supra note 135, at 3.
14 Katner, supra note 133, at 63; SCHWEINHART ET AL., supra note 135, at 3; CED,
supra note 131, at 30.
150 Belfield, supra note 138, at 212; CED, supra note 131, at 30 (noting child welfare
programs cost government an estimated $17 billion per year); SCHWEINHART ET AL., supra
note 135, at 3; Heckman, supra note 131, at 18 (stating that "adverse childhood life
experiences are correlated with adult disease burden and medical care costs").
151 See CED, supra note 131, at 30; see also SCHWEINHART ET AL., supra note 135, at
3 ("88%... of savings came from crime, 4%... came from education savings, 7%... came
from increased taxes .... and 1%.. . came from welfare savings").
"I CED, supra note 131, at 25; WILLIAM T. DICKENS ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., POLICY
BRIEF #153: THE EFFECTS OF INVESTING IN EARLY EDUCATION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 1
(2006) [hereinafter BROOKINGS INST., EFFECTS OF INVESTING IN EARLY EDUCATION],

availableat http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/papers/2006/4/education%20
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economic growth, 53 and more than offsetting public investment in early
childcare. 54 Predicted returns vary, but all are positive. 55 Heckman, for example,
estimates the rate of return on quality early childhood education as exceeding 10%higher than standard stock market returns. 156
In sum, mounting evidence demonstrates the benefits of high-quality childcare
spill over to society at large in a number of ways. Yet families consider only the
private, internal benefits of childcare in determining their willingness to pay. 57 The
result is market failure. The demand for quality childcare is inefficiently low from a
societal perspective, leading to an underallocation of quality childcare in the
58
market.1
2. ChildcareInformation Problems
Even in the absence of these spillover effects, childcare experts have identified
information deficits as an additional driver of failure in the market. Parents face
challenges in understanding the markers of quality care and then locating it, and
agency costs make outsourced childcare difficult to monitor.' 59 Gaps in information

dickens/pb153.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HE3R-BQBF; SCHWEINHART ET AL., supra
note 135, at 3-4; Heckman, supra note 131, at 21.
153 CED, supra note 131, at 33.
154 Id.

155 One study found that the PPS's economic returns to the general public were $12.90

per dollar invested.

SCHWEINHART ET AL., supra note 135, at 3. Others estimate that
preschool programs targeted at disadvantaged children provide an annual return on
investment of somewhere between 7 to 18%. CED, supra note 131, at 25. Simulated
expansions of public preschool to all children similarly predict positive returns. Id.
156 Heckman, supra note 131, at 21. As The Brookings Institution observes:

Because most of these benefits are longer-term while the costs of mounting the
programs are more immediate, the political system tends to be biased against
making such investments. However, any business that operated in this way would
likely fail to succeed. A similarly dim prospect may be in store for a country that
fails to take advantage of such solid investment opportunities.
BROOKINGS INST., EFFECTS OF INVESTING IN EARLY EDUCATION, supra note 152, at 7.
117 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, THE ECONOMICS OF EARLY

CHILDHOOD INVESTMENTS 9 (2014) [hereinafter CEA], available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/docs/earlychildhood reportl.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K7R
W-EPDR; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 81; INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT,
supra note 108, at 6, 89.
158 PARENTS, supra note 76, at 31.
9 England & Folbre, Capitalism, supra note 8, at 35-36, 46; Folbre & Nelson, supra
note 9, at 136.
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ability to make accurate childcare decisions, impeding market
frustrate parents'
60
efficiency.
Multiple studies report that parents lack sufficient information about a variety
of childcare characteristics-the advantages and attributes of high quality childcare,
the indicia of childcare quality, the location and availability of care, the relative costs
of care, and information on the range of care alternatives. '61In one recent study, for
example, economist Naci Mocan found that information asymmetry and adverse
selection in the childcare market tend to drive down quality in America's childcare
market, effectively creating a sort of "market for lemons."' 62 Mocan's study found
that because parents are unable to effectively evaluate quality, they are unwilling to
pay a premium for increases in quality.' 63 With low demand, childcare centers have
care, and adverse selection leads to a market
no incentive to provide higher-quality
64
filled with lower-quality providers.'
Thus, social spillovers and information problems lead to significant
inefficiencies in our childcare market.' 65 1 now move to consider the implications of
market failure for government action.
See England & Folbre, Contracting,supra note 88, at 72. In perfectly functioning
markets, all buyers and sellers are fully informed about their transactions. COLE &
GROSSMAN, supra note 114, at 14; FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 85, at 326-28;
MERCURO & MEDEMA, suprd note 97, at 66. But in real-world transactions, consumer
information is often incomplete, and/or buyers and sellers have differing levels of
information about the transaction ("asymmetric information"). See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON,
supra note 11l, at 20; COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, at 17-18. In the context of
asymmetric information, sellers typically are better informed than buyers. FRANK &
BERNANKE, supra note 85, at 333. This asymmetric information leads to "adverse selection":
because buyers are unable to identify high quality, they are unwilling to pay the prices
commensurate with that quality. Id. at 340-41. Sellers will therefore be unable to command
higher prices for higher quality, leading to a "market for lemons" that reduces the average
overall quality of goods or services available. See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111,
at 20; BLAU, supra note 64, at 160, 211; FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 85, at 333-34;
George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
160

Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-92 (1970); Mocan, supra note 70, at 743-44.
161 CEA, supra note 157, at 9; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 78-81;
INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 6, 67, 89.
162 See Mocan, supra note 70, at 743.
163Id. at

773.

11 Id. at 773-74. A second consequence of asymmetric information is "moral hazard,"
when one party to a transaction can take actions that are unobservable to the trading partner.
See BLAU, supra note 61, at 160. Moral hazard raises special concerns in the childcare
context, where agency costs can be high, and their consequences grave. Id. at 160. In 2012,
for example, among the many thousands of individuals determined to have caused or
knowingly allowed child maltreatment, 3,511 perpetrators were identified as daycare
providers. See U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 71 (2012),
archived at
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2012.pdf,
http://perma.cc/L62A-X3LG.
165 Externalities and information imperfections are the most frequently cited market
failures, and those that generate the most unanimity among childcare experts. But some have
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3. The State Role in Market Failure

Economic theory helps to explain the childcare crisis I identified in Part II. It
also suggests a new theoretical and practical legal orientation toward childcare,
reflecting the reality of the childcare market and its failures. Economics provides a
more transparent and effective rationale for state intervention.
All markets manifest some degree of market failure.'1 66 And when markets fail,
government action can enhance efficiency.1 67 The goal of correcting market failure
in fact served as the basis for much of the regulation of economic activity in the
twentieth century, including worker safety regulations, highway speed limits, airbag
requirements, and pollution emissions limitations. 68 Because markets are never
perfectly efficient, legal-economic policy and change are a constant reality in
169
modem, mixed-market economies.
A finding of market failure has specific implications for state involvement:
intervention to mitigate it. 170 The existence of failures in our childcare market
suggests the state confront and revisit norms of family privacy and private
dependency that have served to limit and muddle government involvement, and to
embrace an increased public role in the childcare market to address market failure.
This economic analysis of our childcare market offers a pragmatic new rationale for
a more resolute state role in childcare--one that is tied to the realities of how
childcare is provided today, and that acts as an antidote to the state's historically
ambivalent and hands-off approach. Although government intervention in markets
also argued that the childcare market is also an imperfect capital market in which parents
face liquidity constraints. See VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 81; INVESTING IN
CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 34, 39-40, 89. Parents of young children have low
incomes relative to their permanent adult income streams, but cannot borrow against their
children's future income to finance high-quality childcare. VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note
108, at 81; INVESTING INCHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 6, 39-40. These constraints
prevent parents from making the socially optimal investments in childcare. Id. at 39-40, 89.
166 See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supranote 111, at 19.
167 Id. at 611. According to economist Arthur Pigou, the essential purpose of
government is to correct market failures to "control the play of economic forces in such wise
[sic] as to promote economic welfare, and through that, the total welfare, of their citizens
.... " A. C. PIGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 129-30 (4th ed. 1962); see also COLE &
GROSSMAN, supra note 114, at 19 (discussing how the government can, and does, intervene
in the market to correct failures).
168 See COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, at 19. One basic microeconomic text
asserts, for example, "the need to deal with externalities is one of the most important
rationales for the existence of government .... FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 85, at 298,
305,408.
169 See MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 97, at 51.
170 See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 611; COLE & GROSSMAN, supra
note 114, at 19; FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 85, at 298, 408; RICHARD 0. ZERBE JR.,
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 165 (2001); CEA, supra note 157, at 2932; INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 32.

2015].

CHILDCARE MARKET FAILURE

is by no means a panacea, 7 1 responding to market failure is one step by which the
state can respond to childcare realities more coherently and effectively, and better
leverage childcare's many societal benefits for our larger community.
C. Privacy, Redux?
Of course, existing social and legal norms consider government interventionwhether in families or markets-to be the antithesis of privacy. A confrontation
between government intervention and privacy norms therefore creates the potential
for significant tension. Yet in reality, the boundaries between public and private are
blurry, whether in the context of the family or the market.172 Family privacy doctrine
yields to state regulation over all manner of family decisions. Likewise, free market
primacy yields to other, legitimate concerns about market functioning. Thus,
families and markets are both publicly and privately constituted, operating inside
and outside the law.
An increased-and more coherent-state role in America's childcare need not
be incompatible with privacy norms. A more nuanced understanding of these norms
and their motivations enables us to articulate a role for the state that is more coherent,
pragmatic, and involved, while nevertheless respecting the core values reflected by
privacy concerns.
1. Family Privacy
Although the rhetoric of family privacy often suggests a monolithic state
approach, in reality the state has intervened pragmatically and regularly in all
manner of disputes within families and between families and the state. 173 The
primacy of parental rights has never completely precluded the state's separate
interest in and responsibility toward children. 174 And the realities of the late
171.Like markets, government policymaking is also imperfect and govemment
interventions themselves can fail. See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 20. Some
forms of government intervention can impede optimal market performance. Id. at 20, 611.
And experience teaches that government actions do not always seek to vindicate the social
good. Id. at 792.
172 Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction, supra note 88, at xiii-xiv.
171
Meyer, supra note 11, at 594.
174 The doctrine of parenspatriaehas long served as the primary rationale for regular
state interventions-and often aggressive ones-in family life. This doctrine has long been
recognized (and indeed continues to operate) as establishing a state right and responsibility
to protect those who are incapable of protecting themselves. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, A
VERY SPECIAL PLACE IN LIFE: THE HISTORY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN MISSOURI 4-6 (2003).
By the early to mid-nineteenth century, American law was recognizing a substantial role for
parenspatriae,even to the point of superseding the rights of natural parents. Id. at 5. At the
time Meyer and Pierce were decided, children's status in the law was in flux, assuming both
public and private dimensions. Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 1068. But by then it was clear
the state itself had an interest in children, one that at times justified intervention in family
life and decision making. Thus, Meyer recognized that "the State may do much, go very far,
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twentieth and early twenty-first century have exploded the notion of a radical
separation between home and marketplace. 175 The boundaries between public and
private are increasingly blurred, as the family once again is assuming a more
prominent role in public life. It is therefore incorrect to assume that a preference for
nonintervention has led to a rigid barrier between the family and state.
Government intervention to address childcare market failure poses little threat
to core privacy values and concerns. Rather than reaching directly into private
decisions about how to care for children in private homes, state intervention to
address market failure occurs only after childcare has crossed the private-public
divide. Thus, this interaction contravenes neither the spatial or decisional aspects of
76
parental autonomy to make decisions about raising children.1
First, addressing market failure does not implicate the regulation or monitoring
of parental care inside the private space of the home.177 Instead, economic remedies
seek to address spillovers and information problems where they are manifest: in the
public childcare programs that today provide much of the care for America's
children.
Second, state involvement in the childcare market does not impede parents'
decisional autonomy concerning their children. 178 It is a longstanding principle of
indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401 (1922). Pierce acknowledged the state's power to regulate schools and prescribe a civic
curriculum. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). Prince likewise accepted
that "the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child's welfare." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944). A primary
tension at the time, then, was between absolute parental control over children versus the state
interest in ensuring their care and protection. Woodhouse, supra note 33, at 1041.
17'Between the 1960s and the end of the twentieth century, mothers entered the
workforce in expanding numbers, and nonmatemal childcare rose precipitously. CLARKESTEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 42. The number of single mothers increased
significantly in the second half of the twentieth century, most of whom needed to work to
support themselves and their dependents. Id. at 45. A number of other cultural and
demographic changes also led to an increased presence for married mothers in the labor
force. Id. at 47-48. Consequently, the number of children in nonmatemal care has 'isen
sharply and the country has witnessed a marked reduction in parental care provided in the
family home. Id. at 43-44.
176 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
177 In fact, such monitoring is already well established as an exercise of the state's
parenspatriaepowers in child welfare cases. See ABRAMS, supra note 174, at 6 (noting the
Supreme Court recognized early on that parenspatriaepower is most beneficially exercised
"for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves." (quoting Late Corp.
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890))).
178 As I have argued elsewhere, a different set of laws and policies is much more
conscriptive of family decisions in the context of insourcing or outsourcing childcare. See
Harbach, supra note 2, at 285-97. My earlier exploration of the benefits of high quality care,
and of parents' inability or unwillingness to access higher-quality care for their children
might suggest that, rather than simply providing incentives and information to help shape
parental preferences, the state might in fact require that all parents who choose childcare use
high-quality care. INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 52. Crossing this line,
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family law that fit parents act in the best interests of their children, and absent a
finding of abuse or neglect, the state defers to the decisions of parents concerning
childrearing and childeare (at least in intact families). 7 9 Economic theory is agnostic
as to the broader questions about ideal models for childrearing and the zero-sum
"mommy wars."' 80 A positivist economic analysis of market failure in fact takes us
away from normative judgments about who should care for children, and instead
simply evaluates how the existing market is performing and how it might be
improved.' 8 '
Certainly, the foundational privacy values explored in Part II are significant,
but for our purposes here, they should help shape the state role in childcare, not
foreclose it. At bottom, grounding state intervention in economic theory leaves
significant room for individual decision making, pluralism, and private choices in
private spaces. Viewed in this light, it's clear that increased state involvement in the
childcare market need not conflict with the foundational values that underlie
longstanding norms of nonintervention in family life.
2. Market Privacy

Although markets may be conceived of as "public" when contrasted with the
private family, they take on a different character when positioned alongside the
state.' 82 Much like family privacy norms, neoclassical economics sees the market as

however, would infringe on the core foundational family liberty and privacy protections that
have echoes in our childcare policy. See BLAU, supra note 61, at 215. That's not to say,
however, the state could not "nudge" parents toward higher-quality care. See Meredith
Johnson Harbach, Nudging Parents, 19 J.GENDER RACE & JUST. (forthcoming 2015); see
also

RICHARD

H.

THALER & CASS

R.

SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT

255 (2008) (suggesting that sensible "choice
architecture" can successfully nudge people toward the best decision without restricting their
HEALTH,

WEALTH,

AND

HAPPINESS

freedom of choice). Indeed, one overarching purpose of the policy recommendations
discussed below is to shape parental preferences and steer them toward higher quality care.
Even further, because children's relationships with their parents are even more determinative
of child outcomes than childcare, see INVESTING INCHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at
99, policy initiatives that help develop and support high-quality care by parents and family
members would also promote healthy child development and generate positive societal
externalities. Child-Care Effect Sizes, supra note 130, at 114; INVESTING IN CHILDREN
REPORT, supra note 108, at 85.
1 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000).
180 See Harbach, supra note 2, at 259-61 (describing the media's preoccupation with
pitting stay-at-home mothers against wage-working mothers).
81 Martha M. Ertman, The Business of Intimacy: Bridging the Private-Private
Distinction, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY,

supra note 4, at 467, 469.
82 Fineman, Cracking the FoundationalMyths, supra note 5, at 190 n.3; Fineman &
Dougherty, Introduction, supra note 88 at xii-xiii (noting market characterization is
"chameleonlike").
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"private"-a private realm in which government intervention and regulation is

suspect. 183
One of the baseline tenets of neoclassical economics is that legal rules and
regulation tend to hinder rather than enhance economic and social efficiency.1 14 If
the assumptions of neoclassical economics and the invisible hand held true, markets

would operate efficiently and lead to socially optimal results, leaving little, if any,
role for nonmarket forces.185 But that is not the world in which we live. Economists
have long acknowledged that assumptions suggesting a strictly hands-off approach
to markets simply do not hold in the real world. 86 Instead, this market ideal is a
187
benchmark against which we can compare the "messy reality" of actual markets.
Real-world economics recognizes that state intervention is permissible--even
desirable-toenhance efficiency.8 8
Moreover, the economic approach to remedying market failures is one that
remains, for the most part, committed to the continuing operation of a wellfunctioning market, in which individual market actors are able to order their
preferences. Market failure remedies almost never contemplate state takeover, and
we should remain attentive to the potential inefficiencies that can result when
government action eclipses markets. 189 The ultimate goal is not to supplant
individual choices, but rather to enhance them and enable the individual actions of
buyers and sellers to yield socially optimal, efficient outcomes.

183

Dougherty, supra note 96, at 3-4; Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction, supra note

88, at xii-xiii.
184 Fineman & Dougherty, Introduction,supra note 88, at xvi.
185 BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 611; COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note
114, at 10 ("Efficiency, thus, becomes the economists' proxy for social welfare; the more
efficient is a given allocation, the greater the welfare benefits for society.").
186 See COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, at 17-18 (discussing the strategic behavior
of free riders and holdouts).
187 Buchanan, supra note 88, at 68; McCluskey, Politics ofEconomics, supra note 6, at
199-200. Newer developments in economic theory recognize these realities in a variety of
approaches: law and behavioral economics, social economics, and ecological economics. See
Kysar, supra note 87, at 101-12. Many approaches to economic analysis reject the "pure"
neoclassical model. See, e.g., Blank & Reimers, supra note 60, at 158-59; England & Folbre,
Contracting,supra note 88, at 63; Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 131, 133-34, 138.
88 That's not to say that neoclassical economists don't retain their skepticism of
government intervention, however.
189 Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Care, Inequality, and Policy, in CHILD CARE AND
INEQUALITY: RETHINKING CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 133, 142-43 (Francesca
M. Cancian et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter England & Folbre, Inequality]; McCluskey,
Deconstructing, supra note 99, at 147. An important exception arises in the context of
"public" or "merit" goods, in which case one potential remedy for market failure is direct
and exclusive state provision of services. Providing for the national defense is a prime
example. See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 485, 787.
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3. Private Dependency
The collision between government intervention and privacy norms is perhaps
most direct in the context of the preferences for private dependency discussed above
because, as we'll see below, economic theory prescribes state subsidies as one of the
most powerful ways in which to address positive spillovers. Material, public support
for childcare seems at odds with the complex system of private dependency
enshrined in family law and deeply entrenched in societal norms.
Economic theory confronts this aversion to public support head on. It explains
why an aversion to public support is not just unfair, but inefficient. The concept of
spillovers has metaphorical as well as practical salience, reminding us that childcare
is significant not only for individual children and families, but also for our
communities and society at large.' 90 The existence of spillovers also reinforces the
91
moral case for increased state involvement with childcare.1 Once we understand
the significance of these social spillovers, we recognize our own incentives to
engage in collective, strategic behavior-enjoying childcare's benefits without
93
92
sharing in its costs.' From this perspective, society is free riding on childcare.
At a cultural level, the economic lens has special expressive and normative
significance for family privatization norms. 194 Recognizing the existence of a
substantial childcare market and its failings has the potential to change the narrative
about American childcare and the state's involvement with it. The market lens shifts
our focus from what isprivateabout raising children to what ispublic. It makes plain
95
both the public benefits of childcare and its attendant public costs. 1 This new
childcare narrative invites us to revisit our understanding of public spending on care.
On the view of human capital96 theory, public expenditures on childcare aren't
handouts; they're investments.'
Thus, perhaps ironically, economic analysis of our childcare market can
97
broaden and enrich our understanding of public policies toward childcare. This
190 Brinig, supra note 4, at 456.
'9' England & Folbre, Who Should Pay, supra note 89, at 195-96; Folbre, Public
Goods, supra note 101, at 89.
192 England & Folbre, Who Should Pay, supra note 89, at 202.
193 England & Folbre, Capitalism, supra note 8, at 35; Fineman, Cracking the
FoundationalMyths, supra note 5, at 188; England & Forbe, Who Should Pay, supra note
89, at 195-96, 201-03; Folbre, Public Goods, supra note 101, at 86-87, 89. Understood
another way, childcare is a subsidy to society in the form of addressing collective dependency
that is necessary for society to endure. Fineman, Cracking the FoundationalMyths, supra
note 5, at 182-83. While beyond the scope of this Article, I note here that this justification
for state support of caregiving implicates both paid and unpaid care. See Folbre, Valuing
Care, supra note 101, at 92; Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 121.
194 Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 138; Silbaugh, supra note 4, at 85.
"I The notion of childcare spillovers challenges "the children-as-pets approach" to
children as consumption items, which individuals will create and care for if they derive utility
so. England & Folbre, Who Should Pay, supra note 89, at 197.
from doing
96
1 Id. at 203.
197 Id. at 204.
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analysis illustrates that far from being simply a private, family concern, the way
children are cared for and nurtured ought very much to be a public concern, with
significant economic and moral implications for society. State involvement isn't
only about enhancing efficiency; 9 ' it's also the right thing to do.' 99
Mindfully adopting an economic approach to the childcare market helps to
overcome the incoherence and ambivalence that marks existing childcare regulation
and policy. Embracing this approach not only recognizes a significant and legitimate
role for government intervention in childcare markets, but also respects the primacy
of diverse choices, allowing the market to reflect the individual preferences of
families and childcare providers. I conclude this Article by considering how the
United States might move toward a better functioning childcare market.
IV. ADDRESSING CHILDCARE MARKET FAILURE

My analysis thus far has suggested a reorientation of our childcare law and
policy so as to better respond to the realities of our contemporary childcare market
and its shortcomings. In this final Part, I explore the implications of economic theory
for the design of state interventions.
My aim here is to begin a conversation about reconfiguring law and policy to
foster a more efficient childcare market that supports and enhances socially optimal
outcomes. I begin in general terms, with a theoretical exploration of economic
prescriptions for spillovers and information problems. I then analyze existing
childcare law and policy in light of these prescriptions. I conclude with thoughts on
reform. Using revisions to the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF) program as a
case study, I consider how our law and policy might evolve to respond more
effectively to childcare market failure.
A. Market Failureand the State: Reimagining the State Role in Practice

One of the virtues of the economic model is that it provides not only a
theoretical rationale for state intervention in markets, but also practical strategies to
address specific facets of market failure. 200 In the case of the spillovers and
information problems identified in Part III, demand for high-quality care will not

That's not to say that government intervention is the only--or always the bestapproach to addressing market failure. In addition to government intervention, private actors
and private law offer alternative or additional approaches to confronting market failure. See
198

COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, at 18-19.
'1 See McCluskey, Politics of Economics, supra note 6, at 215, 217 (noting state

involvement would promote economic well-being); England & Folbre, Who Should Pay,
supra note 89, at 204 (noting state involvement would be more equitable and more efficient).
200 "Basic principles of welfare economics suggest that government intervention in the
child care market would be warranted if the childcare market allocated resources
inefficiently, feasible policies existed that could improve the allocation of resources, and the
benefits of such policies exceeded their costs." BLAU, supra note 61, at 210.
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increase unless families have better information about childcare201quality, how to
access it, how to monitor it, and stronger incentives to purchase it.
This section explores the practical implementation of economic theory through
state intervention. I begin with the threshold question of what policy focus should
be the priority in shaping state intervention, and then turn to examine what types of
intervention economic theory would prescribe for the predominant problems in our
childcare market.
1. Revisiting Demand: Demandfor What?

As I explained above, economists have identified low demand as the root of
childcare market failure, because individual childcare transactions do not capture or
reflect all of childcare's spillovers, and because families lack crucial information
about childcare. And, as I will explore below, economics teaches that particular state
interventions can help to address the market failure caused by this low demand. But
demand for what? Any argument that government can and should intervene in the
childcare market to affect demand must first address the threshold question of what,
precisely, the focus of our childcare policies should be.20 2
The answer is not as obvious as it might seem. Childcare policy might pursue
a number of goals, some of which may conflict. These goals might include: child
development, facilitation of parental employment, and early intervention for
disadvantaged children.2 °3 But policies aimed at ensuring the optimum quantity of
hours necessary to support parental work will not necessarily-and often do notyield the optimum quality of care.20 4 And services directed solely at disadvantaged
children-while critically important-would overlook other children who would
benefit from quality improvements, and the broader benefits generated by
investment in their early childhood education and care.
The economic response is that policy interventions to correct market failure
should focus on the precise roots of that failure-in this case, low demand for quality
childcare. Economists and child development researchers have established that the
central failure in the childcare market relates to lower-than-optimal demand for
higher quality care.20 5 Childcare quality determines the future academic and social
success of children that secures positive benefits not only for those children and their
families, but also for society at large. It is childcare quality that is at the root of the
childcare spillover problem. And it is information about childcare quality-what it
201

Id.

See id. at 125 (discussing both employment-related and child development-related
programs).
203 INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 88.
202

204

See

BLAU,

supra note 61, at 12, 49-50; INVESTING

IN CHILDREN REPORT,

supra note

108, at 88. Higher quality care, for example, typically requires greater investments of time
and money by parents. BLAU, supra note 61, at 12. But see CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN,

supra note 32, at 27 (noting that functions of basic care and cognitive development have
merged so that many childcare providers seek to provide both).
205 See BLAU, supra note 61, at 12-13.
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is, how to find it, and how to assure that one's child receives it-that is at the root
of the information problems in our childcare market.2" 6
That's not to say that other potential policy goals-parental employment and
targeted interventions to assist our most disadvantaged children and families-are
not worthwhile. Indeed, strong arguments for such interventions have been
articulated on fairness, distributional, and social justice grounds.0 7 And as I will
discuss below, interventions that respond to quality-related market failure will
undoubtedly reach vulnerable children and potentially influence parental
employment incentives. 2 °8 The focus of my analysis here, however, is what we can
learn from economic theories of market failure, and what interventions that theory
would prescribe for the state.20 9
Consistent with the well-developed economic and social science research on
the childcare market and its failings, the focus of my analysis of market interventions
is childcare quality.210 With this threshold question answered, the discussion that
follows considers particular interventions to address problems of spillovers and
information imperfections.
2. Spillovers
Subsidies and regulation are potential remedies for the childcare market's
positive externality problem. To understand the appeal of subsidies, recall that in the
case of positive spillovers, consumers fail to account for all benefits generated by
their consumption of a particular service, which in turn affects how much they
demand and what they are willing to pay.21' One way to address externalities is to
alter consumer preferences so that their market transactions reflect not only the
service's individual benefits but also its larger societal benefits. 2 12 In this context,
the centrality of incentives in formulating legal policies that affect markets becomes
apparent.2 3 In the case of remedying positive externalities, the object is to induce
206

See id.

207 See, e.g.,

supra note 108 and accompanying text.
Childcare subsidies that help defray a family's childcare expenses increase
incentives to work outside the home, for example. BLAU, supra note 61, at 49.
209 As Blau observes, employment-conditioned childcare interventions "cannot be
justified by the claim that the child care market is inefficient"; it may be, "but not for the
reasons associated with employment." BLAU, supra note 61, at 213.
210 BLAU, supra note 61, at 12-13, 105, 220; Child-CareEffect Sizes, supra note 130,
at 114; CEA, supra note 157, at 8, 16; PARENTS, supra note 76, at 33. Yet to answer this
initial question about the normative focus of childcare policy invites another: if quality is to
be the focus of our market interventions, what, exactly, is quality childcare and how do we
measure it? BLAU, supra note 61, at 15; see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
211 See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 770 ("[I]nefficiencies arise because
people fail to account for all the social costs and benefits of their actions").
208

212

213

Id.
See COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 114, at 1-2; MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note

97, at 43.
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the consumer to act as if she will reap the internal andexternal benefits of the market
transaction.
Subsidies address spillovers by providing a supplement equal to the marginal
external benefit the transaction generates to society.21 4 The direct provision of
services, a form of subsidy, is another way to address concerns about positive
external benefits.2 15 The government frequently steps in to provide services itself in
addition to-or in place of-the market in the case of "public" or "merit" goods.2 16
Although more frequently discussed in the context of information problems
(and generally less popular with economists), quality regulations are another
2 17
potential mechanism to raise the quantity of a service to socially optimal levels.
Specifically, to the extent childcare regulations are binding and enforced, they
should drive lower-quality services out of the market, and/or induce providers to
increase the quality of services they provide.21 8
3. Information Problems

In the case of information imperfections, state action can enhance efficiency by
making information more transparent and available. Common market interventions
include the imposition of minimum quality standards and regulations, and the
provision of information to consumers.

214 BERNHEIM

& WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 771;

FRANK

& BERNANKE, supra note

85, at 308-09.
215 See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 785, 789; CEA, supra note 157, at
11. 2 16
BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 789; INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT,

supra note 108, at 52.
61, at 173; CEA, supra note 157, at 11; V. Joseph Hotz & Mo
Xiao, The Impact of Regulations on the Supply and Quality of Care in Child Care Markets
217 See BLAU, supra note

1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11873, 2005), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w 11873.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/W6EB-UFDJ.
218 See BLAU, supra note 61, at 181-82; Hotz & Xiao, supra note 217, at 7. Regulation
tends to benefit those consumers with a strong preference for quality, but may disadvantage
those with weaker quality preferences. BLAU, supra note 61, at 181. In addition, quantity
controls are sometimes used to mitigate market failure caused by positive externalities.
Quantity controls seek to remedy the externality problem by controlling the level of activity
that produces it. See BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 769. Compulsory public
education is one example of a quantity control used in conjunction with the direct provision
of services. Because at least ten years of education generates socially optimal results, it is
more straightforward and less expensive to require this level of education and provide it free
of charge, rather than to simply provide private incentives via subsidies. See id. at 7.79-80;
BLAU, supra note 61, at 161-62; INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 66.
Quantity controls, however, are problematic in a context like early childhood education and
care because they could constrain parental choice in a setting in which there is a great
diversity of preferences and about which there is considerable disagreement. See Harbach,
supra note 2, at 278-82.
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Frequently, information asymmetries are equalized by the imposition of
minimum quality standards, which offset consumers' information deficits.2 1 9 The
theory is that regulations increase baseline quality and therefore reduce the
uncertainty consumers face as a result of unequal information.220 To the extent
problems arise because consumers are unable to adequately monitor the quality of
care their children receive, regulations can mitigate this problem as well.22 1
Another approach is to engage in direct efforts to educate consumers and
provide them with information to make better-informed choices.22 2 The state can
undertake efforts to compel sellers to provide additional information about their
products and services so as to reduce information gaps. The state can also "screen"
services, establishing tests or benchmarks that induce providers to reveal
information about quality. 223 And information asymmetries can be addressed via
"signaling," in which a seller undertakes a.particular activity-such as accreditation
or licensing-that should provide enhanced information on quality to potential
buyers.224
In conclusion, economic analysis of the childcare market prescribes a policy
focus on quality childcare, which is at the heart of existing market failure. And
market failure theory suggests three broad categories of state intervention to
ameliorate problems with the childcare market: subsidies, regulations, and the
provision of information.225 I turn now to evaluate existing childcare law and policy
in light of these prescriptions.

219 BERNHEIM & WHINSTON,

supra note 111, at 21-8;

INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT,

supra note 108, at 35.
220 CEA, supra note 157, at 11.
221

See id. at 16-17.

See BLAU, supra note 61, at 11-12; Mocan, supra note 70, at 744; INVESTING IN
CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 4, 35.
223 BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 21-22.
224 FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 85, at 341; BERNHEIM & WHINSTON, supra note
111, at 21-8, 21-10. Product warranties and screening companies like Consumer Reports
provide this service for numerous goods sold in the American marketplace. BERNHEIM &
WHINSTON, supra note 111, at 21-28; FRANK & BERNANKE, supra note 85, at 341.
225 Although the focus of this project is on the state role in childcare markets, it is worth
noting that private sector actions can also help to mitigate market failure and support healthy
market functioning. We might, for example, reconceptualize childcare as a cost that
employers shift to parents and families. See McCluskey, Politics of Economics, supra note
6, at 208. Capitalizing on pro-care trends in the private sector is another option. See England
& Folbre, Inequality, supra note 189, at 141. Finally, some economists argue for the "reprivatization" of the economic benefits of children by, say, paying a parents' dividend
through social security, or a "bounty" to parents whose childrearing yields spillover benefits
to society. See England & Folbre, Who Should Pay, supra note 89, at 203; Folbre, Public
Goods, supra note 101, at 89. Yet this path would push us to view children in increasingly
instrumental terms, simply one of parents' "individual investments, part of their larger
portfolio." England & Folbre, Who Should Pay, supra note 89, at 203-04.
222
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B. Existing ChildcareLaw and Policy
Despite the lack of a coherent vision for the state role in our childcare market,
both the federal and state governments interact with today's childcare market via
subsidies, regulation, and the provision of information. As is obvious from the
analysis above, however, these interventions have not been sufficient to counteract
the market's spillover and information problems, and may even exacerbate them. In
the discussion that follows, I evaluate and critique our existing childcare law and
policies based on the economic recommendations explored above.
1. Subsidies
Both the federal and state governments have subsidies in place, primarily aimed
at facilitating parental employment. But as currently configured, these subsidies do
little to address childcare spillovers.226
At the federal level, the state supports childcare via subsidies and tax benefits.
Beginning with the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) program
has been the primary federal mechanism for delivering childcare subsidies.227 Since
Moving beyond the issue of quality, existing funding streams fall woefully short of
reaching eligible children and families. And the United States Department of Health and
Human Services recently estimated that the number of children receiving childcare assistance
will fall to a fifteen-year low in 2013. Hannah Matthews, Recent Child Care Growth to Fade,
226

Startling Drop in Assistance Projected, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY (Mar. 1, 2012),
http://www.clasp.org/issues/child-care-and-early-education/in-focus/recent-child-caregrowth-to-fade-startling-drop-in-assistance-projected, archived at http://perma.cc/6EHZ-

G3VQ. For example, although the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) funds
supports services for approximately two million children each year, it is estimated that only
between 15 and 17% of eligible children actually access CCDF funding. See CLARKESTEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 35-36; CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., CHILD CARE
SUBSIDY POLICY: ACCESS TO WHAT? 7 (2012) [hereinafter ACCESS TO WHAT], availableat
http://www.naccrra.org/sites/default/files/default sitepages/2012/subsidywhitepaper-_

finalseptl 7.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/HKF8-ACAF. Because of funding constraints,
Head Start only serves 60% of eligible families. CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note
32, at 34. Similarly, recent reports detail that state governments are providing subsidies to
fewer families than in the past. A recent report by the National Women's Law Center shows
that, for the second year in a row, child care assistance policies in a majority of states left
families worse off than the year before. See KAREN SCHULMAN & HELEN

BLANK, NAT'L

WOMEN'S LAW CTR., DOWNWARD SLIDE: STATE CHILD CARE ASSISTANCE POLICIES

2012,

at 1 (2012), availableat http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/NWLC2012_State
ChildCareAssistanceReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CZD7-MU3Q. And even
though the childcare tax benefit program represents the largest public investment in
childcare, like other funding streams, this benefit program is in fact quite limited. Cohen,
supra note 32, at 36.
227 CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 35. The CCDF actually refers to
two separate federal funding streams for childcare-the Child Care Development Block
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its inception, CCDF funding has primarily focused on enabling low-income parents
and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) recipients to work.228 States
also provide some childcare subsidies for low-income parents.229
Federal and state tax benefits tied to employment also help defray the cost of
childcare. 230 The federal child and dependent care tax credit allows families to
reduce their overall tax liability by a percentage of their childcare costs.23 ' Lowincome families who do not pay federal taxes cannot access this tax credit,
however.232 Alternatively, parents may use the Dependent Care Assistance Program
("DCAP"), an employer-based fringe benefit, to take a pre-tax salary deduction for
childcare expenses. 233 But the DCAP has a limited impact because employers must
elect to participate in the program (and few small employers do), and employees
must also take advantage of the plan.2 34
The federal and state governments also subsidize childcare via the direct
provision of services. Most of the federal government's direct provision of care
comes through Head Start, long considered the flagship federal childcare program.2 35
This program provides a comprehensive and holistic set of supports to low-income
families including education, health, nutrition, and mental health services for

Grant and Section 418 of the Social Security Act. See KAREN E. LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL30785, THE CHILD CARE AND DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT: BACKGROUND AND
FUNDING, at 1 (2014), available at http://ffyf.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RL30785-

CCDBG-1-30-14.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M7XH-989N. Since the passage of the
1996 welfare reform legislation, these two streams have been consolidated and administered
under the same rules. Id. at 2.
228 LYNCH, supra note 227, at 2.
229 Most of this funding comes from the federal Child Care and Development Block
Grant (CCDBG), Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), the Social Services
Block Grant, and some state funds. See CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM., CHILD CARE IN
AMERICA: 2012 STATE FACT SHEETS 5 (2012) [hereinafter STATE FACT SHEETS], available

at http://www.naccrra.org/sites/default/files/default-sitepages/2012/2012nationalsummary
factsheets.pdf, archivedat http://perma.cc/W7DH-FW9P.
230 Some states have similar tax provisions to offset childcare expenses. See NAT'L
WOMEN'S LAW CTR., FAMILY TAX CREDITS: STATE CHILD AND DEPENDENT CARE TAX
PROVISIONS, TAX YEAR 2012 (2012) [hereinafter TAX PROVISIONS], available at

http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/childanddependentcarecreditsfactsheet.pdf,
archivedat http://perma.cciN8BJ-HKXW.
231 Section 21 of the Internal Revenue Code creates a limited credit equaling a
percentage of the taxpayer's childcare costs ifthese costs are incurred as a consequence of
employment. I.R.C. § 21(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). For most middle-class workers, the applicable
credit percentage will be 20%. RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 726 (2d ed. 2007). Some states have similar tax provisions to offset
childcare expenses. See, e.g., TAX PROVISIONS, supra note 230.
232 LIKE THE MILITARY, supra note 1, at 13.
233 The benefit is capped at $5,000. I.R.C. § 129(a)(2)(A). It applies to both on-site
childcare facilities provided by employers and to cash reimbursements of an employee's
childcare expenses. SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 231, at 728.
234 SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 231, at 728-29.
235 CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 33.
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children and their families. 36 It has been widely lauded as successfully intervening
in the liv'es of at-risk children, improving regular academic advancement, increasing
the likelihood of strong performance on cognitive tests, and enhancing social
competence.2 37 Because of funding constraints, however, the program only serves
60% of eligible families, 238 and this number will likely continue to
an estimated
2 39
shrink.

From the standpoint of quality-related spillovers, the problem with most
existing subsidy programs is they are keyed to employment, not quality.
Incentivizing and facilitating parental employment is their primary focus, and
subsidies are largely neutral as to the quality of childcare parents select. 240 Parents
who receive TANF funds must, with few exceptions, work in order to receive
benefits.24 ' Consequently, the CCDF program historically has focused on enabling
low-income parents (most frequently mothers) to work, rather than ensuring their
children receive high-quality care. 242 Tax benefits are linked to work as well.2 43 But
the goals of encouraging employment and facilitating high-quality care don't always
dovetail. Either type of subsidy-employment based or quality based-will reduce
the cost of being employed. 244 But although employment-linked subsidies increase
the quantity of care demanded, they don't increase the quality of care demanded.24 5
The same programs that link subsidies to employment have been mostly silent
with respect to quality. While CCDF regulations have purported to impose health
and safety requirements, most of these requirements were undefined and led to

236 Id

Id.
Id. at 34.
239 See, e.g., Elle Moxley, Some Communities Could Lose Head Start ProgramsIf
Automatic Federal Cuts Kick In, STATE IMPACT (Feb. 26, 2013, 8:44 AM),
http://stateimpact.npr.org/indiana/2013/02/26/some-communities-could-lose-head-startprograms-if-automatic-federal-cuts-kick-in/, archivedat http://perma.cc/K8ZF-432B.
240 BLAU, supra note 61, at 211-12. Blau estimates that two-thirds of our existing
subsidy funds require parental employment but are silent with respect to quality. Id. at 216.
The CCDF does require a minimum quality set-aside of 4%, and many states have exceeded
that set-aside. LIKE THE MILITARY, supra note 1, at 34; see also CLARKE-STEWART &
ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 36 ("Not only has the CCDF provided subsidies and vouchers
that enable families to select suitable childcare, it has also provided funding for qualityenhancement efforts .... "). Still, this percentage is a negligible fraction of the block grant
funding, and an even smaller portion of the overall childcare market. LIKE THE MILITARY,
supra note 1, at 34.
241 See Harbach, supra note 2, at 291-92; LIKE THE MILITARY, supra note 1, at 33.
242 See BLAU, supra note 61, at 12, 158 ("[T]he reformed child care subsidy program,
237

238

the Child Care and Development Fund ... is almost exclusively employment-related ...
Cohen, supra note 32, at 37.
243 BLAU, supra note 61, at 67, 98.
244
Id. at 216.
245
Id. at 210.
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inconsistent implementation of the CCDF program nationwide.2 46 The program
allows parents considerable flexibility, including the ability to use vouchers,
provided the selected programs meet licensing and regulatory requirements under
state law. 247 The problem, however, is that states determine those licensing and
regulatory standards and, as we'll see below, most states exempt significant
segments of the childcare sector from licensing and regulation. 24 8 Consequently, the
CCDF has not required that all federal funds be used in licensed settings. 249 And
recent research indicates only one-third of all care funded by the CCDF is "of good
quality., 250 Likewise, the child and dependent care tax credit and DCAP tax
programs require no licensing or regulation, meaning high quality care is neither
incentivized nor monitored. 5 1
An economic approach to market failure suggests that we shift the focus of
childcare subsidies, keying them to quality, 252 and thereby responding to the positive
253
spillovers of the childcare market.
2. Regulation and Oversight

Child development experts are frequent critics of the United States' existing
system of childcare regulation. 4 Although parents reasonably assume government
regulation steps in to control for quality and safety in the childcare market, 255 the
reality of government licensing and oversight is limited and uneven. Overall
standards are low. Many states do not apply existing regulations to family childcare
providers, and most states inspect regulated providers only infrequently. 6

246 Child Care and Development Fund Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,442, 29,466 (May 20,
2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 98).
247 CLARKE-STEWART

& ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 35.

A series of political compromises surrounding the CCDF resulted in this system, in
which states set regulatory standards and can exempt many forms of care from regulation
altogether. See LIKE THE MILITARY, supra note 1, at 30-31.
249 ACCESS TO WHAT, supra note 226, at 5.
248

250

160 CONG. REC. H7474-75 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2014) (statement of Rep. Bobby

Scott).

& ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 36-37.
See Child-CareEffect Sizes, supranote 130, at 114; PARENTS, supra note 76, at 8.
253 Blau suggests that alternative policies aimed at parental employment-if that is a
policy goal-might include the Earned Income Tax Credit and a tax credit for families with
children. BLAU, supra note 61, at 67.
254 See, e.g., BLAU, supra note 61, at 219-20 (discussing proposals by Professors
Sharon L. Kagan and Nancy E. Cohen).
255 LIKE THE MILITARY, supra note 1,at 7-8.
251 CLARKE-STEWART

252

256

Id.; see also NAT'L Ass'N OF CHILD CARE RES. & REFERRAL AGENCIES, THE

ECONOMY'S IMPACT ON PARENTS' CHOICES AND PERCEPTIONS ABOUT CHILD CARE 11

(2010), availableat http://www.naccrra.org/sites/default/files/publications/naccrrapublicat
ions/2012/economysimpactonparentschoices.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K4NG-

STVV.
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There are no universal, federal standards regulating the licensing or oversight
of childcare. Although the federal government made attempts to establish minimal
standards for health and safety through the years,2 57 by 1980 all federal standards
were eliminated. Since then, the licensing and regulation of childcare centers has
been left entirely to the states. Federal deregulation has had a negative impact on
childcare quality--discrepancies among states in quality standards has increased,
and most states have raised childcare fees, reduced services, relaxed standards and
requirements, and lightened enforcement efforts.2
At the state level, substantial variation exists as to which categories of childcare
9
are regulated, how it is regulated, and how rigorously regulations are enforced.
The consensus is that state licensing and oversight systems fall dramatically short of
industry benchmarks that gauge childcare quality. 260 In general, the state approach
By 1960, the federal government required that childcare programs receiving federal
funds meet at least basic health and safety requirements. CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN,
supra note 32, at 37. Likewise, because programs during this era had to be licensed in order
to receive federal funds, states began to develop various licensing schemes. Id. As early as
the late 1960s, however, states had already manifest significant differences in terms of their
approach to licensing and regulation standards. Id. In 1968, the United States Office of Child
Development published the Federal Interagency Day Care Requirements (FIDCR). Id. The
level of generality embodied in the standards made them difficult to enforce, and compliance
was never mandated, although noncompliance technically was grounds for losing federal
funds. Id. at 37-38. By 1980, however, the FIDCR standards were eliminated, leaving
individual states alone responsible for licensing, regulating, and monitoring childcare
programs. Id. at 38.
258 Id. at 38.
259 BLAU, supra note 61, at 173-74.
260 See, e.g., STATE FACT SHEETS, supra note 229, at 6 ("Our conclusion after six years
of studying child care regulations and oversight is that we still cannot say with confidence
that America's children are protected by state licensing and oversight systems. Nor can we
say that child care policies are in place to help young children learn and be ready for
school."). There is no shortage of quality metrics available in the childcare context. E.g.
NAT'L ASS'N OF CHILD CARE RES. & REFERRAL AGENCIES, WE CAN Do BETTER:
NACCRRA's RANKING OF STATE CHILD CARE CENTER REGULATIONS AND OVERSIGHT 8
(2011) [hereinafter WE CAN Do BETTER], availableat http://www.naccrra.org/sites/default/
files/default site pages/201 1/wcdb sumchpts 1-5.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XBD6QFSQ; Introduction to the NAEYC Accreditation Standards and Criteria, NAEYC,
http://www.naeyc.org/academy/primary/standardsintro, archived at http://perma.cc/C87PB944 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Recommended Practicesfor Nannies, INT'L NANNY Ass'N,
http://www.nanny.org/resources/agencies/recommended-practices-for-nannies, archived at
http://perma.cc/2C6R-W8U2 (last visited Jan. 29, 2015). The National Association for the
Education of Young Children (NAEYC), for example, has promulgated voluntary guidelines
based on the expert study and advice of childcare researchers, providers, and policymakers.
Introduction to the NAEYC Accreditation Standards and Criteria,supra. The NAEYC is a
group of childcare researchers, providers, and policymakers that study and work to improve
childcare quality. The group first established quality guidelines in 1985, and has revised them
repeatedly. See CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 39. Childcare programs
may voluntarily adopt the NAEYC standards and seek NAEYC accreditation, a signal to
257
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has been to set a floor that aims to prevent harm to children rather than aspiring to
developmentally rich childcare programs. 26' All states and the District of Columbia
regulate center-based care, but overall the standards these centers must meet are
inadequate when compared to standards recommended by national accreditation
agencies.262
Even more concerning, family childcare providers, who provide care for
children in private residences, are regulated inconsistently or not at all. There is great
variability in what is considered family childcare among states, and many exempt
certain forms of home-based arrangements from licensing requirements
altogether. 263 Because informal arrangements are so widely used by American
families, experts estimate that as much as 90% of the childcare provided in the
United States is unregulated. 264 And family childcare is the most common form of
care accessed by families with children under six whose mothers work. 265 Most
nonparental care provided to children in their own homes is also exempt.266
Whether regulations can improve overall quality depends on how many
providers they monitor, how stringent they are, and how rigorously they are
enforced.267 Little wonder, then, that existing studies suggest that regulations have
parents that their childcare is of high quality. Id. Similarly, Child Care Aware (previously
the National Association of Child Care Resource & Referral Agencies) has developed fifteen
research-based standards for childcare licensing and oversight requirements, and has issued
several reports evaluating states on meeting these benchmarks. See WE CAN Do BETTER,
supra, at 8. The licensing requirements are meant to set out the minimum health, safety, and
program standards for centers and family childcare that provide for unrelated children on a
regular basis for a fee. Id. at 9. They include: staff/child ratio requirements, group size
requirements, qualification requirements for center directors, qualification and training
requirements for lead teachers, comprehensive background check requirements,
requirements for child development programming, licensing guidelines for basic health and
safety standards, and requirements to encourage parent involvement. Id. at 16-17. Oversight
policies gauge compliance with state licensing and program requirements. Id. at 9. They
include a requirement that all centers and family childcare homes caring for unrelated
children on a regular basis be licensed; a requirement of four annual visits by licensing,
health, and fire personnel; maximum ratios of program to licensing staff requirements;
minimum education requirements for licensing staff; and requirements that oversight
information be made available to parents. Id. at 17.
261 Phillips & Zigler, supra note 26, at 4. Although a portion of the CCDF goes toward
improving childcare quality in the states, they have broad discretion in determining how to
spend block grant funds, and each state therefore crafts its own standards and oversight
policies. See STATE FACT SHEETS, supra note 229, at 6; OFFICE OF CHILD CARE, CHILD CARE
AND DEVELOPMENT FUND 1 (2012), availableat http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
occ/ccdf factsheet.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/V3XK-NBJH.
262 CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 32, at 40.
263 Id. at 40-42.
264
Id. at 41.
265

Id. at 42.

Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,442, 29,472
(May 20, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 98).
266
267

BLAU,

supra note 61, at 181.
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only modest effects on both quality and cost in childcare markets. 268 The current
regulatory scheme suffers from spotty applicability and enforcement. 269 Regulations
also reflect the diverse quality preferences of different states. 270 And they are limited
to managing structural quality features, which are proxies for, rather than indicators
of, process quality.27'
In sum as measured by these criteria, existing state regulations are destined to
be ineffectual at improving quality: they apply to too few providers, their aspirations
are meager, and they are poorly enforced.
3. Information

The information states make available to families concerning childcare quality
and accessibility varies, but tends to be sporadic and incomplete.272 Although most
states have established agencies to oversee childcare licensing and regulation and
provide some information online, there typically is no central method or system used
to provide this information to parents and families.
In terms of locating childcare, most states provide an online search function
that allows parents to search for providers by location and type.27 3 But many state
websites rely on links to outside resources like Child Care Aware and local resource

See id. 207.
See id.; Hotz & Xiao, supra note 217, at 2-3.
270 BLAU, supra note 61, at 210.
271 See id.; Hotz & Xiao, supra note 217, at 2.
272 See Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,442,
29,460-63 (May 20, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 98).
273 See, e.g., Informationfor Parents,CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., http://ccld.ca.gov/
PG524.htm, archivedat http://perma.cc/7JWQ-4HR3 (last visited Jan. 16,2015); Searchfor
268
269

Child Care Center or Home,

TEX.

DEP'T OF FAMILIES

& PROTECTIVE

SERVS.,

http://www.dfps.state.tx.us/Child Care/SearchTexasChildCare/ppFacilitySearchDayCa
re.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/YGZ8-LWZT (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Welcome to
Vermont Child Care Information Services,

VT. DEP'T FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES,

http://www.brightfutures.dcf.state.vt.us/, archived at http://perma.cc/95ZX-LMXU (last
visited Jan. 16, 2015); Wisconsin's Regulated Child Care Search, Wis. DEP'T OF CHILDREN
archived at
& FAMILIES, http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/childcare/licensed/search.HTM,
http://perma.cc/3NSY-VDKF (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); S.C. CHILD CARE: EARLY EDUC.
& CARE, http://www.scchildcare.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/D362-S98P (last visited
Jan. 16, 2015).
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websites are geared toward childcare
and referral organizations. 274 And some state
2 75
providers rather than parents and families.
As for information about childcare quality, some states make health and safety
information for licensed providers available to parents online, but many do not.276 A
growing trend among states is the implementation of quality rating and improvement
systems (QRIS), which screens providers, providing more information to parents
concerning the quality of care offered in various settings and allowing them to make
comparisons. 277 As of 2012, twenty-eight states were operating QRISs, fourteen
were in the process of developing them, and another seven states were testing such
systems. 278 A significant limitation in existing QRISs is that they are, for the most
part, voluntary. 279 Thus, the number of participating childcare providers is small
relative to the overall number of licensed providers in most states.28 ° Only a few
states require every licensed provider to participate in QRISs, and eleven tie subsidy
rates to their quality rating systems.28 1
Likewise, there are a number of national and state-level voluntary accreditation
organizations that allow childcare providers to signal quality. For example, the
National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC), the "world's
largest organization working on behalf of children," works to improve early
childhood education through a comprehensive accreditation system for early
childhood learning programs. The accreditation process involves significant selfevaluation by the program seeking accreditation, as well as evaluation and
274

See, e.g., Child Care Resource and Referral Agencies, N.Y.

STATE OFFICE OF

& FAMILY SERVS., http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/childcare/referralagencys.asp,
archived at http://perma.cc/87YY-5A5V (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Child Day Care, VA.
DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., http://www.dss.virginia.gov/family/cc/, archived at http://perma.cc
/R8WN-AGR5 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Online Facility ComplianceSearch, KAN. DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
& ENV'T,
http://www.kdheks.gov/bcclr/capp.htm,
archived at
http://perma.cc/KWM2-GSJC (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
275 See, e.g., Child Care Resources, N.J. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES,
http://www.state.nj.us/dcf/families/childcare/index.html, archivedat http://perma.cc/GVR5
-9WUW (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Division of Early Childhood Development, MD. STATE
CHILDREN

DEP'T

OF

EDUC.,

http://www.marylandpublicschools.org/MSDE/divisions/childcare/,

archived at http://perma.cc/J4W9-QLLL (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); Early Childhood
Services in North Dakota, N.D. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., http://www.nd.gov/dhs/services/
childcare/faq/parents.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ZA29-X38M (last visited Jan. 15,
2015); ILL. DEP'T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/daycare/index
.shtml, archivedat http://perma.cc/BL3V-9TTX (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
276 See Shannon Rudisill, Keeping Children Safe and Helping Families Find Quality
Child Care, FAMILY ROOM BLOG (May 16, 2013), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/blog/2013/05/
keeping-children-safe-and-helping-families-find-quality-child-care,
archived
at

http://perma.cc/6PGR-CC4J.
277 ACCESS TO WHAT,
278

Id. at 6.

279 Id.

280

Id. at 7.

281

Id.

supra note 226, at 6-7.

2015]

CHILDCARE MARKET FAILURE

observation by NAEYC assessors.28 2 But only a fraction of childcare providers are
nationally accredited.28 3
Thus, despite the existence of subsidies, some regulation, and the provision of
information, our existing childcare law and policy are poorly calibrated to respond
to market failure. I turn now to consider how we might reform childcare law and
policy to better address the market's shortcomings.
C. Toward a More Efficient ChildcareMarket
Existing law and policy are unresponsive to the roots ofchildcare market failure
in both theory and practice. In this section, I explore possible reforms to subsidy,
regulation, and information programs that would better address our childcare market
defects, and also consider larger institutional design questions.
1. Subsidies
To respond to childcare spillovers more effectively, the state would better
account for childcare spillovers by overhauling and increasing subsidies for quality
284
care.

282

See Overview of the FourSteps, NAEYC, http://www.naeyc.org/academy/pursuing

/fourstepoverview, archivedat http://perma.cc/S3BW-3XF3 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015); see
also KREADER ET AL., supra note 71, at 3; Hotz & Xiao, supra note 217, at 14-15 (describing
NAEYC organization and its accreditation process).
283 Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,442, 29,462
(May 20, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 98).
284 The form of subsidies could be refined to address demand, supply, or both. On the
demand side, subsidies could take a number of forms that would act to incentivize family
demand for higher quality childcare. Policy could take the form of increased tax credits, or
vouchers and credit accounts that parents could use to purchase higher quality childcare. See
BLAU, supra note 61, at 216 (describing existing policy proposals by economists); ChildCare Effect Sizes, supra note 130, at 114; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 87. On the
supply side, state policy could fashion subsidies in a number of ways that would increase the
number and continuity of qualified care providers. The state might, for example, provide
subsidies directly to childcare providers, which would reduce the net price of higher quality
care for families. See BLAU, supra note 61, at 64, 160; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108,
at 87; CEA, supra note 157, at 16. Government funds could also be used to create incentives
for providers to remain in the childcare field, or provide tuition subsidies and college loan
forgiveness for students who pursue academic studies in early childhood education.
VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 87. The state has employed similar programs in the
context of anticipated shortages in other critical services, such as nursing and medical
schools. Id. And the state might increase investment in childcare training and professional
development, and in efforts to assist providers in becoming licensed and complying with
regulations. Child-CareEffect Sizes, supra note 130, at 114; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note
108, at 87-90; PARENTS, supra note 76, at 9; CEA, supra note 157, at 16. Supply side
subsidies, however, could present the same types of inefficiencies that arise in the context of
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In contrast to many existing funding streams, a revamped, market-failure
approach would focus on quality rather than simply parental employment. From a
market failure perspective, the crucial adjustment is that any subsidies provided,
whether to families or childcare providers, should be deliberately linked to
increasing the quality of childcare in the market-for example, requiring that
subsidy monies be used to purchase childcare from only licensed or accredited
providers. This approach would incentivize families to demand quality care,
and
285
encourage childcare providers to offer high quality care to attract consumers.
And subsidies could not only be redesigned, but increased.28 6 State subsidies
and/or direct provision of care could be either partially or completely subsidized,
depending on income. 287 A retooled subsidy program-whether partial or
comprehensive-might take any number of forms.

288

Within a means-tested system,

care might be completely free of charge for some families, and available based on a
sliding scale tied to income for others. 289 Subsidies could be phased out altogether
at higher income levels. 290 An expanded subsidy scheme could comprise a variety
of care categories, including direct provision through local school districts, existing
community-based programs, and a29system
of vouchers that would be accepted by
other certified childcare providers. 1 And consistent with values of family pluralism
public schools: low incentives to make effective use of resources, resulting in higher costs
and less efficient activity. BLAU, supra note 61, at 219.
1 285 See, e.g., BLAU, supra note 61, at 209, 221-22; Child-CareEffect Sizes, supra note
130, at 114; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 87; PARENTS, supra note 76, at 9; CEA,
supra note 157, at 11. Studies indicate that families respond to subsidies, and that they are
most effective when they are provided directly to providers or are available to families as
childcare payments become due. VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 87. They also
indicate that the supply of care would rise to meet increased demand, and that improving
care would not be prohibitively expensive. See BLAU, supra note 61, at 210; CEA, supra
note 157, at 11.
286 The move toward universal, high-quality preschool is a promising trend in this
direction, and public support is mounting. In September 2014, 70% of Americans polled said
they would favor the use of federal funds to make high-quality preschool available for all
American children. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., 70% Favor FederalFunds to Expand Pre-K
Education, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/175646/favor-federal-funds-expand-preeducation.aspx?version=print, archived at http://perma.cc/7WE8-WXKE (last visited Mar.
3,2015).
287 One attraction of the subsidy approach is that it is scalable, and need not be all or
nothing. Policies might be carefully focused on low-income families, yet still have a
significant impact on raising the overall quality of childcare. See BLAU, supra note 61, at
232.
288 VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 93.
289 See, e.g., BLAU, supra note 61, at 218-19 (describing such a system within the policy
recommendations of Professors Zigler and Matia Finn-Stevenson).
290 See, e.g., id. at 216-17 (describing Professor Barbara R. Bergmann's phase-out
plan).
291 See BLAU, supra note 61, at 221-22; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 93.
Vouchers could be means tested and phased out at higher income levels. They would have
value only if used to purchase childcare. BLAU, supra note 61, at 221-22.
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and choice, subsidies would be adequate to permit parents to choose among quality
options for their children. 92 At the other end of the spectrum, childcare could be
provided by the government for all who desire it, free of charge.293
The elephant in the room is, of course, how to fund increased subsidies,
especially in times of economic restraint. 294 The cost of a universal system would
far exceed a system of more targeted subsidies. Advocates of this system recognize
would have to be eliminated to fund even a
that current tax credits and subsidies
295
portion of a universal system.
One middle ground approach might follow the Department of Defense's lead,
which has a system in place to ensure universal access to quality childcare for service
members.2 96 All military families have access to sponsored childcare providers,
which include center-based care, family childcare, school-age care, and part-day
preschool. 297 The fees they pay are based on family income 298 and are matched by
equal amounts of appropriated funds to enhance quality. 299 The program also
provides fee assistance to families who cannot access military installation-based
childcare.3 °° In terms of quality oversight, installation programs must be inspected
or receiving military funding must
regularly, 30 1 and all care provided by the military
30 2
meet minimum quality and safety standards.
In refashioning subsidy design, we must remain attentive to two other potential
downsides. First, public funding raises concerns about "crowd out"-the extent to
which public services replace private ones. 30 3 It's true that some of the private care
crowded out is likely to be parent care, 304 although some predict that a decline in the
overall quantity of time spent on parental care may be accompanied by an increase
292 PARENTS,
293

supra note 76, at 9; see also Harbach, supra note 2, at 281.

See, e.g., INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 90 (citing the criche

system in France as an example).
294 Revamped subsidy programs also would raise a number of practical challenges at
the implementation level, which federal, state, and local bodies would have to work out.
Implementation questions include: how to deliver vouchers or subsidies to eligible families;
addressing any shortages of childcare during transition to the new system; and the
relationship between a new federal subsidy approach and state and local systems. BLAU,
supra note 61, at 228-30.
295 See VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 93; see also BLAU, supra note 61, at 222
(stating that the proposed system would replace the entire childcare subsidy system).
296 See LIKE THE MILITARY, supra note 1, at 36-42.
297

298
299

Id. at 40-41.

Id. at 41.
Id.

300 Id.
301 Id. at 32.
30
2 Id. at 41-42.
303

See INVESTING INCHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 5 n.3, 90.

104 See BLAU, supra note 61, at 49 ("[A] child care subsidy that defrays some or all of
the mother's child care expenses increases the incentive to be employed."); INVESTING IN
CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 90. It's not clear that such crowd out would
necessarily be best for children in all instances. Id. at 3.
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in its quality.30 5 A second challenge is that of "take up"-government funded
services frequently fail to reach all eligible demographics, and may have especially
low take up among some groups because of lack of information, transaction costs
associated with making means determinations, or lack of supply at particular
geographic locations.3 °6 While increased information can get at some take-up
challenges, others likely will remain.
2. Regulations

Enhanced regulation of childcare would also respond to the market's quality
related problems by ensuring that all providers meet baseline standards and
regulating out low-quality providers.3 °7 In light of the dearth of federal standards,
we might consider nationalizing certain baseline standards that all childcare
providers must meet. For example, federal monies could be tied to regulatory
provisions that define minimum levels of quality childcare and include other specific
requirements, such as background checks, fingerprinting, and basic and continuing
education requirements. 30 8 And more conscientious enforcement would positively
impact quality and be a more reliable check for less-informed families.30 9
Increased regulations aren't necessarily a silver bullet, however. Economists
tend to be wary of regulations that directly interfere with markets because of their
potential for unintended consequences. Rather than simply incentivizing
preferences, regulations require significant resource investments to enforce and
impose costs on consumers and providers.310 Consequently, they may increase costs,
lower supply, and push parents toward "underground" providers-that is, unlicensed
family childcare. 311 And the costs to providers and consumers may be relatively
hidden.3 12 Moreover, regulations raise the specter of government failure: they are
implemented through a political process, 3vulnerable
to rent seeking and corruption,
13
perfect.
from
far
be
may
enforcement
and

305

See England & Folbre, Capitalism, supra note 8, at 41; Harbach, supra note 2, at

269.
306 INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 90. State-sponsored, universal
programs would overcome take-up problems because presumably parents would be

informed, there would be no costs associated with eligibility determinations, and the care
would be provided by the state. Id.
307 BLAU, supra note 61, at 174, 179. Many child development experts urge increased
regulation and inspection of childcare providers, including mandating minimum structural
requirements. See Child-Care Effect Sizes, supra note 130, at 114; VANDELL & WOLFE,
supra note 108, at 87; CEA, supra note 157, at 10.
308 PARENTS, supra note 76, at 9.
309
310

Id.

See BLAU, supra note 61, at 173, 207, 215.

311 Id. at 219; Hotz & Xiao, supra note 217, at 2.

supra note 61, at 207.
Folbre & Nelson, supra note 9, at 137.

312 BLAU,

313
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Economists V. Joseph Hotz and Mo Xiao recently studied the effects of state
regulation on the quality and supply of childcare.31 4 Their findings present a mixed
picture of regulation: on one hand, state regulations increase the quality of services
provided, as measured by the rate of accreditation.31 5 On the other, regulations
reduce the number of center-based childcare providers. 31 6 What is more, highincome areas experience the greatest increases in quality, while low-income areas
experience the greatest reduction in providers.31 7 Some of the children who are
crowded out of center-based care because of higher prices move to family childcare
providers, who care for more children but do not increase staffing. 3' 8 Because family
childcare is much less likely to be licensed or otherwise regulated, quality tends to
be lower, leading to less optimal outcomes for those children and leading to negative
societal spillovers.31 9
Thus, lawmakers must confront a series of trade-offs in considering the
imposition of more exacting regulations: documented increases in quality but a
reduction in center-based care, potentially pushing lower-income children into less
regulated settings. 32" Consequently, subsidy and regulation reform ought not be an
either/or proposition. To adequately address spillover and information problems,
while offsetting the potential crowd-out effects of regulation, a mixed system of
subsidies and regulations, or a system of universal access, will be necessary.32'
3. Information
Perhaps the most straightforward way to ameliorate information deficits about
childcare is to simply provide enhanced information to parents and families.322 To
effectively address documented problems, information provided should include the
323
features and benefits of high-quality care, how to discern it, and where to find it.
In terms of information about the features and benefits of high-quality care,
states could develop expanded public information campaigns to provide this
information directly to parent consumers.32 4 One could imagine, for example, an
information campaign designed to reach parents as they and their children reach
various milestones in early childhood-for example, at birth and via regular child

314
315

316

Hotz & Xiao, supra note 217, at 1.
Id. at 6.

Id. at 5.

Id.
Id.
319
Id. at 32.
32
317

318

Id. at 35-36; see also England & Folbre, Inequality, supra note 189, at 143.
CEA, supra note 157, at 16.
322 See BLAU, supra note 61, at 214, 220; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 87;
321

CEA, supra note 157, at 9.
323 See BLAU, supra note 61, at 214; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 78;
INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note 108, at 4, 35; CEA, supra note 157, at 9-10.
324 See CEA, supra note 157, at 10.
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wellness and vaccination appointments. 325 Indeed, partnering with healthcare
providers who will most frequently see parents with their children during early years
could be an especially fruitful collaboration.
To help parents discern the level of care provided by various programs, the state
could screen childcare providers in a number of ways* all of which would be
enhanced by more exacting and extensive state regulation. The universal
implementation of mandatory QRISs that report quality levels for all licensed
providers to parents would significantly increase the information available to them
when selecting among various childcare options. At a minimum, states might require
all licensed providers to report certain "structural" features of the care they provide,
such as adult-child ratios, group sizes, and education and training, and make this
information publicly available.32 6
States might also establish certification programs to signal quality, or subsidize
private signaling through certification and accreditation of providers. 37
Accreditation could be expanded to include family day care and professional
328
nannies/babysitters, which frequently fly under the radar of existing regulations.
Finally, to assist parents with locating childcare, the state could increase
investment in childcare referral agencies, which assist families in understanding,
identifying, and securing quality childcare in their communities. 329 States could also
encourage private employers to provide resource and referral
services to assist
330
credits.
tax
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In conclusion, economic theory and scholarship on market failure provide a
broad menu of reforms that would better address the quality problems that plague
America's childcare markets. But as I explored above, policymakers frequently will
find themselves making choices among competing goals, and weighing relative
costs and benefits.3 In addressing childcare market failure, the whole of subsidies,
regulation, and information is greater than the sum of its parts. The best strategy for
addressing this failure is to take an integrated approach, combining all three
initiatives to capitalize on their synergies and offset their negative effects. The final
institutional design question considers the level at which these strategies should be
implemented-federal or state.

See BLAU, supra note 61, at 221.
& WOLFE, supra note 108, at 70, 74, 87.
327 BLAU, supra note 61, at 220-2 1; VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 108, at 70, 74, 87.
328 BLAU, supra note 61, at 221.
325

326 VANDELL

329

Child Care Aware is one such organization. Child Care Aware of America describes

itself as the "nation's leading voice for child care." About Us, CHILD CARE AWARE OF AM.,
http://childcareaware.org/about-us, archived at http://perma.cc/D63A-PGW2 (last visited

Jan. 16, 2015). Child Care Aware of America also advocates for childcare policies that
positively impact children and families. See id.
& WOLFE, supra note 108, at 90.
3" MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 97, at 51.
330 VANDELL
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4. Meta-Level InstitutionalDesign: Federalism Questions

Policy design questions concerning subsidies, regulation, and information raise
important issues concerning the locus of childcare law and policymaking: individual
states versus the federal government. Some are wary of too much control at the
federal level, 332 while others advocate a nationalized approach to childcare
of the
regulations. 3 Indeed, federalism debates have long been one source
334
ambivalence and inaction manifest in political debates around childcare.
On one hand, locating primary control at the federal level could yield
significant benefits. A federal commitment to increasing childcare quality would
serve a strong expressive function in emphasizing the importance of childcare
quality, not only for children and their families but also for society as a whole.335
National standards would help overcome many of the problems caused by the
varying and overall low threshold regulatory standards currently in place at the state
level. 336 And because significant federal funds have been-and will continue to bedevoted to childcare subsidies, affording federal authorities increased control would
help ensure those funds are being used appropriately.337
On the other hand, states are well suited to experiment with a variety of
approaches to policy design, and excessive control at the federal level could hinder
innovation, competition, and choice.3 38 Regulatory oversight at the federal level,
especially over such a localized 339 and fragmented market, likely would be unwieldy
tap into
and more expensive than oversight at the state level.340 Other objections
3 41
life.
family
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government
federal
the
of
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the
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debates
larger
A middle way might be to tie federal monies to baseline federal requirements
concerning the licensing and regulation of childcare providers in all states, thereby
federalizing basic childcare standards across the country, but without completely
nationalizing all childcare regulation. Congress has taken this approach in multiple
supra note 61, at 215; INVESTING IN CHILDREN REPORT, supra note
108, at 4 (discussing economics Professor Anne Witte's proposition that federally funded
childcare programs are inefficient and inequitable).
311 See, e.g., PARENTS, supra note 76, at 9.
334 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
335 Phillips & Zigler, supra note 26, at 5.
332

See,

336

Id.

e.g.,

BLAU,

337 Id.
338 Eloise

Pasachoff, Block Grants, Early Childhood Education, and the
Reauthorization of Head Start: From PositionalConflict to Interest-BasedAgreement, 111
PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 361-62 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive
Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 265 (2005) (arguing the economic benefits of federalism
are choice, competition, and innovation).
339 Hotz & Xiao, supra note 217, at 11.
340 BLAU, supra note 61, at 215.
341 Phillips & Zigler, supra note 26, at 6. A focus on localism and concerns about federal
overreach have long been featured prominently in family law and policy debates. See
Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
131, 182-83 (2009).
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contexts in which child well-being has been of concern, mandating a floor of
standards and requirements that all states must meet, but leaving states ample room
to experiment with different approaches above that floor. Child support is a good
example: Congress has mandated that all states have child support guidelines in
place, but states are free to develop specific details of those guidelines. 342 The menu
explored above is expansive enough to present federal and state governments with
an array of possible permutations, and flexible enough to allow for experimentation,
competition, and choice at the local, state, and federal levels.
Although mostly overshadowed by more contentious political issues, recent
congressional reforms to the CCDF provide a case study in responding to childcare
market failure, illustrating one approach to refining childcare law and policy. In the
discussion that follows, I evaluate the reforms' potential to improv6 our childcare
market.
D. Case Study: The Child Care and Development Block GrantAct of 2014
This Article suggests that to counteract spillover and information problems,
childcare law and policy should incorporate a -complementary system of enhanced
subsidies, regulation, and information, all tied to childcare quality. Congress
recently has taken important steps in this direction with the reauthorization of the
CCDF program.
On November 19, 2014, President Barack Obama signed the Child Care and
Development Block Grant Act of 2014 (the "2014 Act") into law. 343 Congressional
sponsors sought to "renew, improve, and strengthen" the 2014 Act's predecessor,
the Child Care and Development Block Grant of 1990.344 In contrast to earlier
legislation, which did not mention quality of care in its purposes,345 the 2014 Act
emphasizes what the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
has characterized as a "renewed focus on the quality of care." 346 Noting the CCDF
program had historically been understood primarily as a work support program for
See, e.g., Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105200, 112 Stat. 645; Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat.
2343; Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305;
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500.
341 Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-186, 128
342

Stat. 1971; Major Actions: S. 1086 - 113th Congress (2013-14),

CONGRESS.GOV,

https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 113th-congress/senate-bill/l086/actions,
archived
at
https://perma.cc/EH79-UVFJ (last visited Mar. 5, 2015) [hereinafter MajorActions]. States
must develop revised CCDF plans in consultation with the State Advisory Council on Early
Childhood Education and Care and implement revisions within three years. See 42 U.S.C. §
9858c (2014).
344 S. REP. No. 113-138, at 1 (2014).
341 Child Care and Development Block Grant
3 46

S.REP. No. 113-138, at 5.

Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 9858 (1994).
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low income women, the committee stressed the need to "orient the program as one
that is equally, if not more, committed to the healthy physical, cognitive, social, and
administration's
emotional development of children .... ,,34 Likewise, the Obama
348
priorities for reauthorization focused on improving quality.
The CCDF reauthorization represents a pivotal opportunity to increase the
emphasis on childcare quality, and indeed, the committee meant for the
reauthorization to set a base level of quality expectations. 349 Consistent with this
renewed focus, among the 2014 Act's purposes is assisting states in "improving the
overall quality of child care services" and improving "child care and development
of participating children," 350 with a special emphasis on expanding quality care for
infants and toddlers.35'
Although not framed explicitly as market reform, the 2014 Act sets out a
number of quality-based subsidy, regulatory, and information enhancements that
should augment the performance of the childcare market. The 2014 Act also reflects
congressional consideration of institutional design questions relating to federalism
and parental choice. 352 1 consider each of these aspects of the new law below.
1. Subsidies
As discussed above, subsidies can serve as an important antidote to market
spillover and information problems. The 2014 Act's purposes and provisions serve
an instrumental and expressive function in redirecting the focus of childcare
subsidies toward quality, taking important, if limited, first steps in linking subsidies
to childcare quality. Though it does not condition the use of CCDF funds on a
particular level or category of quality care, the 2014 Act nevertheless includes a
variety of quality-related strings attached to the receipt of CCDF support.
Most specifically, the 2014 Act provides a number of opportunities for states
to key compensation rates to the quality of care provided. These opportunities
include higher compensation rates to incentivize and shore up the provision of
quality care to underserved children, infants and toddlers, children with disabilities,
and children receiving care during nontraditional hours.353 States must also conduct
reliable surveys of market rates for local childcare and describe how they will set
rates, explicitly taking into account the cost to provide higher quality care. 354 And
states may prescribe different rates based on, among other things, a determination
that different rates would better enable parents to choose high-quality care to fit their

347

Id. at 12.
at 4.
34 9
Id. at 12-13.
350 42 U.S.C. § 9857 (2014).
351 S. REP. No. 113-138, at 13. Infants and toddlers constitute almost a third of the
348 Id.

children receiving CCDF funded childcare. Id.
352 Id. at 11-12, 14.
353 42 U.S.C § 9858c(c)(2)(M); S. REP. No. 113-138, at 18, 20.
354 42 U.S.C. § 9858c(c)(4).
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family's needs.3 55 The 2014 Act also requires states to spend increasing percentages
of CCDF funding to enhance childcare quality.3 56 And recognizing the importance
of market forces, the 2014 Act directs states to facilitate public-private partnerships
so as to increase the supply and quality of childcare statewide.357
The Senate Committee also recognized that childcare quality depends on the
caliber of the childcare workforce.3 58 Consequently, the 2014 Act requires states to
implement training and professional development requirements for CCDF providers
that promote healthy childhood development.359 They must also develop and
implement strategies to provide technical business
assistance to all childcare
360
providers to expand, supply, and improve quality.
Thus, in contrast to its predecessor, the new law specifically links funding to a
variety of activities relating to childcare quality, and builds in accountability for state
agencies to ensure they are working toward improving quality care and its supply. It
does not, however, mandate that federal monies be used only to provide care of a
particular quality.
2. Regulation and Oversight
To better respond to market failure, childcare regulations should be more
exacting, apply to more providers, and be more rigorously enforced. Consistent with
this insight, the Senate Committee determined the 1990 Act's requirements were
insufficient to ensure the basic health and safety of children.36 ' The 2014 Act adds
new requirements concerning licensing, health and safety training, monitoring, and
criminal background checks.
First, states must certify they have in place a system of effective childcare
licensing, and must provide a detailed description of their requirements and how
they are enforced. 362 If CCDF funds are paid to license-exempt providers (who
355 Id. § 9858c(c)(4)(C)(ii)(IV).
356 Id. § 9858e. These quality set-asides must be devoted to at least one of the following
activities: supporting the training and professional development of childcare workers;

improving development or implementation of early learning and developmental guidelines;
developing, implementing, or enhancing a tiered quality rating system for childcare
providers; improving quality and supply of infant and toddler care; establishing or expanding
a statewide system of childcare resource and referral services; facilitating compliance with
state regulatory requirements; evaluating and assessing the quality and effectiveness of
childcare programs and services offered; supporting childcare providers in voluntary
accreditation; supporting state or local efforts to develop or adopt high-quality program
standards; or other activities designed to improve quality of care. Id. § 9858e(b).
...
Id. § 9858c(c)(2)(P).
"I S. REP. No. 113-138, at 13.
359 42 U.S.C. § 9858c.
360

Id.

361

S.

REP. No.

113-138, at 6 (stating that the "current form is inadequate to ensure the
basic health and safety of children").
362

42 U.S.C. § 9858c.
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provide care for almost one in five CCDF children),363 states must further explain
364
why such exemptions do not endanger children's health, safety, or development.
Second, states must develop and implement a number of additional state-wide
requirements and policies, including enforced health and safety requirements for all
learning and
CCDF providers, 365 childcare disaster plans, 366 and early
367
developmental guidelines for children ages birth to kindergarten.
Third, within two years of the statute's enactment, states must have
enforcement policies and practices in effect for the regulation and licensing of CCDF
providers. For licensed providers, qualified state inspectors must perform at least
one prelicensure inspection for health, safety, and fire prevention, and at least one
unannounced inspection for compliance with all health, safety, fire, and state
licensing. standards per year. 368 The same inspectors must also perform an annual
inspection 369of exempt providers for compliance with health, safety, and fire
standards.
Fourth and finally, an important enhancement in the 2014 Act is the imposition
of mandatory, comprehensive criminal background checks for childcare providers
and their employees. The 2014 Act requires all childcare providers licensed,
regulated, or registered under state law, or receiving CCDF funds, to conduct
370
criminal background checks on employed or prospective childcare staff members.
These childcare providers cannot hire or employ individuals who refuse to consent
to background checks, knowingly make false statements, are registered sex
offenders, have been convicted of a violent felony or drug-related offense within the
last five years, or have been convicted of a violent misdemeanor against a child.371
While an important first step, these reforms are nevertheless limited. Although
all states must have effective childcare licensing in place, the 2014 Act does not
require licensing of family childcare providers, one of the most prominent sectors of
the childcare market, and one of the most frequently unregulated. Further, although
the 2014 Act requires all CCDF providers comply with baseline health and safety
S. REP. No. 113-138, at 16.
3 42 U.S.C. § 9858c. They must also provide information on the child-to-provider
ratio standards for CCDF providers, and the secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services may offer guidance on appropriate ratios. Id.
365 Id. Health and safety topics must include: preventing and controlling infectious
diseases, preventing sudden infant death syndrome and safe sleeping practices, preventing
and responding to allergic reactions, building and premises safety, preventing shaken baby
syndrome and head trauma, emergency preparedness, handling and storing hazardous
materials, safe transportation, first aid and CPR, and minimum health and safety training
appropriate to providers. Id.
363

Id.
Id.
368 Id.
366
367

369 Id.

Id. § 9858f. The background check requirement does not apply to care providers
who are related to the children to whom they provide care. Id.
370

371 Id.
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requirements, it does not require states move beyond this basic "floor" of safety to
the kinds of enhanced structural requirements that are correlated with childcare
quality. Moreover, to the extent these requirements apply only to CCDF providers,
they would reach only slightly more than
20%372 of the estimated 2.3 million
37 3
childcare providers in the United States.
3. Information
To offset information problems, market-based reforms would include more
transparent and educational information about childcare. Congress intended the
2014 Act to encourage states to provide information to facilitate informed childcare
choices, and included 374a number of specific requirements designed to enhance
consumer information.
First, states must provide consumers with information on the availability and
quality of childcare.375 Second, states must publish licensing and inspection data,
including monitoring and inspection reports and instances of death, serious injuries,
and substantiated child abuse that occur in childcare settings each year.376 Third,
states may use CCDF funds to augment the level of information provided to
families.37 7 Finally, at the national level, the 2014 Act requires the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to operate a high-quality and accessible toll-free
hotline and website to publicize childcare information and assist families in locating
safe, quality care, with a range of options, that best suits family needs. The HHS

372 Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 29,442, 29,442
(May 20, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 98) (estimating 500,000 providers
participating in CCDF Program).
371 Id. at 29,477 (estimating total number of paid childcare providers in the United
States).
374 42 U.S.C. § 9858.
375 Under the 2014 Act, states must certify that they provide information to CCDF
families and the broader public, including: information about provider availability;
information about provider quality, including any available QRIS ratings; a state website
describing processes for investigating, licensing, and monitoring providers; available
assistance to purchase childcare; additional means of securing childcare assistance; research
and best practices in child development; and state policies on children's behavioral health.
Id. § 9858c.
376 Id. And states must make this information available in a user-friendly, accessible
format, organized by provider. Id.
377 The Act permits the use of CCDF funds to establish or support a system of childcare
resources and referral organizations to provide parents with consumer education about the
full range of childcare options available, to work directly with CCDF families in making
choices that are appropriate for their children and are of high quality, to collect data and
provide information regarding the supply of and demand for childcare in particular
communities, and to establish public-private partnerships to increase childcare quality and
supply. Id. Among the quality set-aside options that states may pursue are the development
of QRIS systems and support for voluntary provider accreditation efforts. Id.
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must also provide references to local resource and referral organizations,
state
378
information about childcare subsidy programs, and other financial supports.
4. Federalism

As explored above, childcare law and policy design raises difficult line-drawing
questions concerning the state-federal balance of power. In a reflection of these
concerns, the Senate Committee stressed the new legislation was designed to
preserve state flexibility; 379 indeed, the goal380of allowing maximum state flexibility
is the first explicit purpose of the 2014 Act.
In a subsection entitled "No Federal Control," the 2014 Act stipulates that the
federal government cannot mandate, direct, control, or condition a state's early
learning and development guidelines. 38' And although states are required to use a
percentage of CCDF monies for quality set-asides, rather than mandating particular
activities, the 2014 Act provides states with an expansive menu of quality-enhancing
3 82
options, requiring only that they spend set-asides on at least one of these activities.
Indeed, as to quality set-asides, the 2014 Act is explicit that this requirement does
not authorize the HHS secretary to mandate specific state childcare quality
383
activities. And above the floor of inspections put in place by the 2014 Act, states
are free to determine what level of frequency and intensity of monitoring is most
appropriate for children in their communities. 384 Notably, the 2014 Act contains no
specific process or structural quality requirements, nor does it mandate the licensing
of particular categories of care. That discretion-and thus the ability to exempt large
segments of the childcare market from regulation-remains solely with the states.
5. ParentalChoice

Consistent with the market-based analysis in part III, the 2014 Act makes clear
the legislation is not designed to supplant family childcare choices. To the contrary,
the purposes of the 2014 Act include promoting parents' choice and empowering
them to make their own decisions as to the childcare best suited to their family's
needs,385 and parental choice remains a "guiding principle of the program.' 3 86

Id. § 9858g.
379 S. REP. No. 113-138, at 1 (2014).
378

382

42 U.S.C. § 9858.
Id. § 9858c.
Id.

383

Id.

384

S. REP. No. 113-138, at 7.

380

381

385 42 U.S.C. § 9858; S. REP. No. 113-138, at 11.
386 S. REP. No. 113-138, at 12; see also 160 CONG. REC. 7477 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2014)

(statement of Rep. Ted Rokita) ("I know that parents, not the Federal Government, are best
positioned to choose child care providers, and this legislation ensures parents will have
power over Federal bureaucracies, which are no substitute for a family.").
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In conclusion, the 2014 Act, the most significant refinement to the CCDF
program since its reorganization as part of the 1996 welfare reform law, 387 marks a
significant improvement for childcare law and policy. It represents an important step
toward integrated reform combining subsidies, regulation, and information-all
focused on quality-that would, enhance the functioning of the childcare market.
The law might also serve as a useful template for broader reform at the national and
state levels. One of the most positive aspects of the legislation is its lack of
controversy.3 88 In contrast to earlier legislative efforts, there were no invocations of
the family privacy rhetoric that stymied earlier attempts at federal childcare policy

reform.
Still, the 2014 Act is also notable for what it doesn't do: require federal funds
be paid only to licensed and/or monitored providers, reform the tax-based subsidy
system, create a system of universal access, mandate oversight of currently
unlicensed childcare providers, or strengthen regulation beyond a floor of health and
safety. These issues remain for legislators-both state and federal-to take up and
consider.
V. CONCLUSION

Childcare matters. At the individual level, childcare impacts children's social
and cognitive development, and predicts a range of better or worse outcomes for
children depending on the quality of early childcare they receive. These outcomes
have broader spillover effects, including on our workforce, tax base, and criminal
justice system. And newer economic literature expands childcare's reach even
See LYNCH, supra note 227, at 2 (describing the childcare reforms of 1996).
388 See 160 CONG. REc. 7475 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2014) (statement of Rep. George
387

Miller) ("We ... recognize a growing national bipartisan consensus about the value of
children being placed in high-quality, safe environments during their early learning years.");
see also Allie Bidwell, Child Care Grant Program to Sail Through Senate, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Nov. 17, 2014, 5:13 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/
17/federal-child-care-and-development-block-grant-program-to-pass-senate,
archived at
http://perma.cc/C8QK-TQFG. The Senate bill was heralded as a significant bipartisan
victory and original Senate version out of committee passed by a vote of 96-2. See Major
Actions, supra note 343. An amended version passed the House of Representatives by
unanimous consent. See Press Release, Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, Mikulski Calls on
Senate to Pass Her Bipartisan Bill to Help American Families Access Safe, Affordable and
Quality Child Care (Nov. 12, 2014), availableat http://www.mikulski.senate.gov/newsroom
/press-releases/mikulski-calls-on-senate-to-pass-her-bipartisan-bill-to-hep-americanfamilies-access-safe-affordable-and-quality-child-care, archived at http://perma.cc/JCW2X3KE. The House version ultimately passed the Senate by a vote of 88-1. See Press Release,
Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, Mikulski Heralds Senate Passage of Her Bipartisan Bill to
Help American Families Access Safe, Affordable, Quality Child Care that Gets Kids Ready
for School (Nov. 17, 2014), available at http://www.mikulski.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/mikulski-heralds-senate-passage-of-her-bipartisan-bill-to-hep-american-famiiesaccess-safe-affordable-quality-child-care-that-gets-kids-ready-for-school,
archived at
http://perma.cc/UC3F-3DV4.
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further to demonstrate that it is an important economic investment and key to
economic development in our communities.
By uncovering the public aspects of childcare and childcare markets, this
project demonstrates that government aversion to a more prominent role in childcare
is both unrealistic and anomalous. Our law and policy must come to terms with the
realities of today's childcare market. In the real world, markets are imperfect. The
childcare market that has emerged to fill gaps in parental and family-based care is
no exception. In the case of market failure, we must overcome our aversion to
government intervention-whether in markets, generally, or families specificallyand recognize that government has an important and legitimate role to play. Our
childcare market is too big-and too important-to fail.

